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Abstract 
China’s recent economic growth has turned the country into one of the major players in 
the global economy, however uneven distribution of its benefits has undermined social 
cohesion of the country and led to outburst of civil unrest. This paper explores to what 
extent can innovation and its diffusion help the provinces achieve within-region 
convergence on income. The study employs Two-Stage Least Squares and Spatial Durbin 
Models to elucidate differentiate the importance of different types of innovation on inter-
provincial income inequality. The results emphasize the importance of innovation, rather 
than invention, for convergence of income, and underscore the harmful effect of 
migration restrictions. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past 30 years China’s rapid economic development has transformed the 
country from one of the “backward” economies to one of the most powerful players in 
the global market. However, in addition to extreme pollution, it has also been responsible 
for the intensified polarization of wealth. Implementation of market oriented reforms in 
1989 have caused not only an economic shift, but also a moral shift from one of the 
world’s egalitarian societies to one of the most unequal ones in the world (Sun & Guo, 
2013; Whyte, 2010), making China an excellent model for examining the processes 
behind income inequality.  
At the time of transition from centrally planned to semi-marketized economy, 
technological capital in China was scarce, hence it made sense to enable some provinces 
to “get rich first” by opening them up to foreign investment and trade in hope that the 
economic development will eventually trickle down to the neighboring provinces. 
Scholars agree that this strategy was preferable to shock therapy employed by ex-Soviet 
Union countries, and allowed for a smoother transition from state control to trade 
liberalization, however it also fueled interprovincial inequality that was further deepened 
by fiscal decentralization and restricted migration. Interregional inequality stimulated 
competition rather than cooperation between regions (Knight, 2014; Yao, 2005, Wei, 
2000) that does not allow provinces to equally enjoy the benefits of the country’s 
economic growth. Furthermore, Yao (2005) cites evidence suggesting that economic 
development of a province is strongly dependent on its proximity to the coastal 
provinces, which underscores the importance of spatial analysis for creating a realistic 
picture of China’s growth (e.g. Cartier, 2013; Chi, Li, & Yu, 2011; Solinger, 2013; Wang 
& Zhao, 2014). Geopolitical prioritization of coastal regions has created a regional divide 
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between regions that were already significantly different in culture, which gave rise to a 
series of separatist movements (Jacobs, 2017). Wealth disparity undermines people’s 
confidence in the economic system, which fuels corruption and rent seeking by those in 
power (Yao, 2005). The central government put forth several initiatives that aimed to 
reduce interprovincial and between region inequality in China, however their 
effectiveness is unclear (An, 2015). Scholars highlighted that while between region 
inequality is still severe, the levels of income and consumption inequality are higher 
when considering provinces in the same region, suggesting that provinces are failing to 
retain the necessary fiscal and labor capital to fuel economic development and raise 
living standards (Wang & Zhao, 2014).  
This paper examines to what extent innovation can fuel within-region income 
convergence by examining the effects of different types of innovation on the levels of 
income inequality within regions. Moreover, the study aims to explore the effects of 
diffusion of knowledge on the existing intraregional inequality. 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the existing economic theory of 
income distribution, highlighting potential solutions and its economic significance. 
Section 3 synthesizes the existing knowledge about income inequality in China, its causes 
and effects, and poses the research questions. Section 4 introduces the variables that serve 
as proxies for innovation and income inequality, and introduces the conceptual and 
empirical models, explaining the construction of the dataset, and presenting findings in 
detail. Section 5 and 6 introduce the models and the results obtained. Section 7 discusses 
the implications of the findings, as well as potential for future research. 
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2. Literature review 
The purpose of economics is to understand and design the optimal allocation of 
scarce resources among individuals and societies. A question of a just distribution of 
wealth has been approached both by theoretical economists and empiricists, and a clear 
solution is still not found. As noted by Bigsten (1983), the distribution of wealth is a 
result of all economic forces that is representative of the state of the economic system, 
hence it is difficult to take all the factors into account and devise a universal solution. 
Moreover, Bigsten (1983) argues that to accurately capture it, an ideal model should not 
only identify the forces acting upon factors of production, but also differentiate between 
the availability of resources in each country, suggesting that the models that apply in 
developed countries often do not apply to developing ones. The following section 
provides a review of theories of economic development that are particularly useful when 
investigating income distribution in China. It starts with analyzing how economists of 
various schools of thought have approached the problem of uneven economic 
development, its causes, and influences, creating a context for the Section 3 that 
examines the state of income inequality in China, and the historical and economic 
processes that have led to it.  
The classical school 
Classical economists, such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Thomas Malthus 
are mostly concerned with the evolution and growth of society. The founder of classical 
economics, Adam Smith, believed that the “invisible hand” regulates the distribution of 
resources under the influence of market forces. In his classic work, The Wealth of 
Nations, Smith detailed that economic development of the nation relies on skill and 
dexterity of the workforce, labor participation rate, whereby societies that encourage 
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division of labor and specialization can develop faster than others (Khan, 2014). 
Technological development not only economize the time needed for manufacturing 
processes, but also fosters further specialization of labor. Smith divided labor into 
productive that “adds to the value of the subject upon which it is bestowed [machinery]” 
(Smith, 1904), and unproductive labor such as court services, and military that do not 
produce value continuously: “great fleets and armies, who in time of peace produce 
nothing, and in time of war acquire nothing which can compensate the expense of 
maintaining them” (Smith, 1904). He argued that overinvestment in unproductive labor 
and institutions that recruit it exhausts the economic potential of a nation as a result of 
inefficiency that it creates. A desire for better living conditions is a motivating force for 
an individual, however Smith acknowledged that self-interest of other members of 
society might impair one’s opportunity to self-actualize. Therefore, this duty shall be 
placed on the government that serves to protect the poor by regulating monopolies and 
encouraging healthy competition. 
David Ricardo then introduced his labor theory of value under which the price of 
goods depends on the quantity of goods produced, rather than the price of the factors of 
production. Like Smith, Ricardo believed that capital accumulation was the main driver 
of growth, so he was interested in the processes that can impair or stimulate it. Ricardo 
divided society into capitalists, workers, and landowners, and proposed that income is 
distributed via profits, wages, and rent. Profits were defined as a surplus of revenue after 
the subtraction of wages and rent, hence Ricardo stressed the importance of fertile soil 
and unrestricted imports. High quality soil would result in increased supply of 
agricultural products, which would drive down the prices of food and wages, hence 
increasing profits. Agricultural imports would have an analogous effect (Khan, 2014). 
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Ricardo posited that the returns on labor and land will eventually diminish, suggesting 
that landowners would be the only party making profit, which would lead to stagnation 
and widening income disparities. Ricardo suggested that there are ways to improve the 
quality of land, perhaps by more appropriate use that would prevent the least fertile land 
from being used, and technological knowledge that would enable the capitalist to pay 
lower rent for a more fertile soil. Ricardo did not elaborate on the importance of 
technological advancement much, but he fervently believed that trade liberalization is the 
key to accelerating economic development because it allows countries to specialize in the 
production of goods in which they have the highest comparative advantage.  
The idea of an egalitarian society first began to appear during the Industrial 
Revolution, which sharpened the divide between the working class and the bourgeoisie. 
Marquis de Condocet and William Godwin were both prominent economists who 
criticized the destructive nature of capitalism during the Industrial Revolution. The 
former advocated welfare support for the poor and limited access to credit for the rich. 
Godwin, on the other hand, took the idea much further by advocating for the need-based 
distribution of property. Ironically, their ideas were dismissed by Thomas Malthus, who 
was fortunate enough to be of the upper class. In his first work, Essay, Malthus states that 
egalitarianism would “oppose the progress of man towards perfection” (Malthus, 1798). 
Furthermore, he believed that, “the inevitable laws of nature” make poverty and 
inequality is inevitable, and neither taxes on the rich nor the government can alleviate it, 
(Malthus, 1798).  
To summarize, Both Smith and Ricardo have expressed a clear preference for 
egalitarian society. Smith suggested that the governments and people should strive for 
perfect competition and allow markets to redistribute recourses themselves, such that 
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everyone’s needs are satisfied. Ricardo has derived a labor theory of value that 
underscored that rent is not determined by price, rather the opposite is true, which 
benefits only capital owners. To decrease the disparity between landowners and everyone 
else, society should strive for technological development that will lower the costs of 
production. Both Smith and Ricardo believed in trade liberalization as a way of 
maximizing market efficiency. Conocet and Godwin, like Smith, suggested that 
government should be in charge of encouraging a more even distribution of resources, 
however Malthus argued that it would be useless, as income inequality is a part of human 
nature. 
The utilitarian school  
Jeremy Bentham took a different approach to capitalism, and believed that “all 
human activity springs from maximizing pleasure”. He supported the idea of diminishing 
marginal utility of income that states that pleasure decreases with each incremental 
increase in income. Therefore, he believed that government should be in charge of 
redistribution of income from higher to lower classes.  
While William Thompson supported Bentham’s idea of hedonic pursuits, he made 
the first argument in favor of egalitarian market socialism. He believed that constant 
competition of the capitalist system does not make people feel secure, and, therefore, will 
always benefit the rich and harm the poor: 
to inequality of wealth there is no bound: it becomes the ruling passion: the distinction 
which it confers, the envy which it excites, urge men to acquire it by any means. Every 
expedient which force and cunning can use to appropriate the fruits of other men's labour, 
and with this view to turn the mass of mankind into ignorant contented drudges, is 
erected into a custom or a law. A universal and always vigilant conspiracy of 
capitalists . . . exists everywhere . . . to cause the labourers to toil for the lowest possible 
wage, and to wrest as much as possible of the products of their labour to swell the 
accumulations and expenditures of capitalists. (...) What accumulated wealth there is in 
such a community is gathered into the hands of few, and as well from its bulk as from its 
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contrast with the surrounding poverty, it strikes every eye (Thompson, 1850).  
He advocated that the control of production should be put in the hands of the 
workers, which can be achieved by private ownership of capital and materials of 
production. This would ensure that the resources be evenly distributed amongst all the 
members of society, leading to an equal distribution of wealth. Thompson stated that 
competition does not stimulate innovation because entrepreneurs are concerned with 
satisfying the needs and demands of the consumers rather than improving the quality of 
life. Thompson passionately advocated gender equality and emphasized that oppression 
of women undermines the development of the society and leads to economic waste. He 
saw the Industrial Revolution as a perfect platform to establish the equality of the sexes 
because “women, if equally trained… [would] be as productively employed...as men” 
(Thomson, 1850) hence they could no longer be discriminated against based on physical 
strength. Overall, Thompson’s vision expressed the first ideas of cooperative socialism, 
and, though it did not become revolutionary, it addressed the importance of gender 
equality for achieving sustainable economic development that modern society is still 
struggling to implement. 
In short, utilitarian theory suggests that humans aim to maximize utility, rather 
than profit, hence the resources should be distributed according to the utility that one 
derives from them. Thompson argued that as workers derive maximum utility from the 
means of production, they should be in full control of them, which would then orient 
them from competition to cooperation, that would improve overall quality of life. The 
main criticism of the utilitarian theory is its subjective nature. Pleasures and happiness 
cannot be quantified; hence it is difficult to argue that changing the current distribution of 
wealth will make the society more equal.  
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The rise of socialism  
Thomas Hodgskin believed that ownership of land is unnatural and often brings 
inefficiency to the economy. He stood up against private property rights, suggesting that 
owners of capital are unproductive idlers who contribute little to economic development. 
For him the concept of private ownership embodied recession of the nation’s economic 
growth, and the main factor behind inequality between the rich and the poor. Hodgskin 
believed that goods and services should be valued based on their “natural price,” which is 
determined by the quantity of labor involved in the production of it; in the ideal society 
one could only own the capital that they have produced or that they use in future 
production. Just like Smith, he argued that society’s main purpose is capital 
accumulation, however he asserted that it is also directly proportional to the accumulation 
of knowledge. Hodgskin infamously posited that “necessity is the mother of invention; 
and the continual existence of necessity can only be explained by the continual increase 
in people” (Hodgskin, 1827), suggesting that population growth is an important factor for 
innovation, as people are the raw materials for knowledge creation. Hence, Hodgskin 
suggested that in order to increase knowledge production and capital accumulation, the 
rewards to labor should be increased to strengthen labor’s motivation to exert their 
resources into innovation. 
The mid-19h century was characterized by the popularization of socialist ideas as 
well as the writings on pure utilitarianism, such as John Stuart Mill’s Principles of 
Political Economy and Frederic Bastiat’s Economic Harmonies. In Economic Harmonies 
Bastiat ignored the idea that wages paid to workers might not sufficiently satisfy their 
needs or allow them to save enough to become a capitalist. Instead, he defended 
capitalists, suggesting that capital ownership is a natural law and it is a sin to refute it. 
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Moreover, capitalist’s suffering, which lies in the production of profitable commodities 
and maintaining the capital acquired, is comparable to the pain incurred by the workers, 
hence capitalists are morally entitled to their profits, interests, and rents, and taking this 
right away undermines the pain and effort invested in profit acquisition. Bastiat believed 
laissez-faire capitalism to be the panacea for class disputes and inefficiency. He justified 
it, saying “in proportion to the capital accumulated, the absolute share of the capitalist is 
diminished. (…) The more plentiful capital is, the lower is the interest rate” (Bastiat,1964 
as cited by Hunt, 2015). However, there is no evidence to prove that decrease in the profit 
rate is followed by the increase in the workers’ relative share of production. Instead, if 
the relative increase in capital exceeds the relative decrease in the rate of profit the 
opposite effect will be observed.  
John Stuart Mill was against the idea of private ownership, and, like Hodgskin, 
opposed the creation of a parasitic class that is able to get rich without toil. His major 
work, The Principles of Political Economy, explored the potential of economic 
development to promote equality, rather than factors that promoted economic growth. 
Mill believed that in the long run economic growth will be stationary, and the focus of 
economics would shift to ensuring equal distribution of resources among all members of 
society. Mill emphasized that the development of science and technology is not only 
essential for increasing production at the lowest available cost, but also for fostering 
social development, as it allows more time to be devoted to improving prosperity of other 
nations, and preserve nature. As can be drawn from the idealistic arguments above, Mill 
did not believe in the notion that people are selfish profit maximizers, rather he suggested 
that capitalism makes them such, therefore after the collapse of capitalism, people all 
over the world would prioritize virtue and leisure over capital accumulation. Every 
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member of society aims to improve the quality of life for others, hence once capitalism is 
abolished, rich members of society will devote their resources to bettering lives of the 
poor: 
When the rich are content with being rich, and do not claim as such any political 
privileges their interest is that of the poor are generally the same (Mill, 2009). 
Contrary to the central assumption of utilitarianism, Mill infamously asserted that 
it is “better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied” (Mill, 2011), hence some 
pleasures are more valuable than others. Mill believed that through education the working 
class can learn to prioritize worldly pleasures, which would then help them move up in 
social hierarchy:  
there is need of a twofold action, directed simultaneously upon their intelligence and 
their poverty. An effective national education of the children of the labouring class, is 
the first thing needful: and, coincidently with this, a system of measures which shall 
extinguish extreme poverty for one whole generation. (Mill, 2009) 
Mill’s idealistic view of humankind, though admirable, makes it hard to apply his 
theory to real life. He asserted that even at his time, developed economies have already 
satisfactory level of development, and should shift their objective from growth and 
prosperity to preservation and equality. However, as data shows, just as rich individuals 
are not so keen to cooperate with the poor, and give up their “political privilege,” 
developed economies do not perceive their level of economic development as adequate 
and aim to develop further, rather than to assure that every member of society benefits 
from it. 
The works of Karl Marx had an apparent focus on the interactions of labor and 
capital in the time of rampant colonization. Marx believed that capitalists’ insatiable 
appetite for profit maximization extends the borders of their motherlands in search of 
new markets, cheaper raw materials, and labor. Marx noted that the expansion of markets 
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benefits only the those that are able to incur technological and fixed costs that are needed 
to optimize production abroad. This implies that capitalist competition forces small 
entrepreneurs out of the market, concentrating wealth in the hands of a small group of 
people. The working class, struggling to survive and unable to obtain education, 
degenerates. In Marx’s words: 
Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time accumulation of 
misery, agony of toil, slavery, ignorance, brutality [and] mental degradation at the 
opposite pole (Cunningham Wood, 1998). 
Even if capitalists decided to raise wages to above the sustenance pay, it does little to 
change the overall state of inequality:  
A rise in the price of labor, as a consequence of the accumulation of capital, only 
means, in fact, that the length and weight of the golden chain the wage-worker has 
already forged for himself, allow of a relaxation of the tension of it…. Such an increase 
only means at best quantitative diminution of the unpaid labor that the worker has to 
supply. This diminution can never reach the point at which it would threaten the system 
itself (Cunningham Wood, 1998).  
The oppressive nature of capitalism will eventually serve as a catalyst for a revolution 
that will give rise to a socialist system that encourages cooperation and human 
development. However, Marx also recognized that while the process of colonization is 
violent and exploitative, the colonies also benefit from a more rapid diffusion of 
technology. He observed British imperialism in China that had disrupted local production 
of handicrafts with introduction of machine-made products. Marx encouraged such 
disruptions, especially if the local mode of production is stagnant, however he also 
recognized that successful adoption of capitalism in non-capitalist countries depends on 
the willingness of the local culture to adapt (Ping, 2009).  
Rosa Luxemburg extended Marx’s theory, offering a deeper analysis of 
modernization of Oriental economies in the imperialist era. She asserted that the Opium 
Wars pushed China to realize its backwardness, thereby forcing the country to “open up” 
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and abandon stagnating focus on self-sufficiency. European invasion started the process 
of modernization by destroying feudalism and the natural economy, and encouraging the 
adoption of capitalist values. Luxemburg then asserted that capitalism will continue to 
reign as long as non-capitalist countries exist, offering capitalists new markets to exploit. 
Only after the world has embraced capitalist ideology will socialist revolution begin, 
prioritizing equality and cooperation. Luxemburg hinted that while European invasion 
was an impetus for modernization of China, the loss of sovereignty has undermined the 
country’s ability to realize its full potential, however this idea was not fully developed in 
her works (Ping, 2009).  
 The marginalist school  
The end of 19th century was characterized by the entrance of three major 
economists, namely William Stanley Jevons, Carl Menger, and Leon Walras, who took a 
new stance on the theories of utilitarian economists by introducing the concept of 
marginal utility. While classical economists believed that the equilibrium price would 
equal the cost of production, thereby implying that income dictates the price, marginalists 
proposed that the prices of goods reflect the marginal utility of consumption and 
production, which then implies that the factors of production - such as wages, rent, 
capital - are dependent on the prices of commodities. Neoclassical marginalism then goes 
on to assume that individuals are not aiming to maximize profits, but are rather trying to 
achieve the maximum pleasure from the scarce resources available. However, as 
consumption patterns of the working class were strictly fixed by their incomes, their 
purchasing decisions were based solely on what they could afford, rather than what 
would please them more. In this context, proprietors, whose decisions were guided by the 
greatest return on the distribution of their resources, were the only party that could derive 
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optimal utility.  
Alfred Marshall has built on Ricardian labor theory of value to examine the role 
of demand in determination of market prices. He mathematically demonstrated that 
perfect competition eliminates all the profits in the long run, and firms are forced to set 
the price that equals to marginal cost, suggesting that in the long run, workers will 
receive subsistence wage.  Marshall was a strong supporter of the invisible hand doctrine 
proposing that human nature determines one’s social status; only workers that possess the 
necessary moral virtues could then become capitalists (Khan, 2014). He acknowledged 
that while capitalism might be oppressive to the working class, an endeavour for social 
improvement that is imbedded into human nature will slowly mold it into a more 
equitable economic system.  
John Bates Clark built on Marshall’s work and devised a principle of substitution 
of labor and capital, that suggests that the wages of workers are determined by their 
productivity in comparison to productivity of capital. He explained that the profitability 
and efficiency of a firm depends on its ability to optimize the use of labor and capital, 
producing the highest quantity at the lowest cost. Technological advancement lowers the 
cost of labor, as the larger share of business tasks can be automated. Highly skilled 
workers, who cannot be easily substituted by the machines, are then rewarded by higher 
incomes, while less educated labor is pushed into low-skill jobs. Both Marshall and Clark 
believed that market forces maximize everyone’s utility, hence income is distributed 
across the population based on workers’ merit. Clark then elaborated:  
The welfare of the laboring classes depends on whether they get much or little; but their 
attitude toward other classes—and, therefore, the stability of the social state—depends 
chiefly on the question, whether the amount that they get, be it large or small, is what they 
produce. If they create a small amount of wealth and get the whole of it, they may not 
seek to revolutionize society; but if it were to appear that they produce an ample amount 
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and get only a part of it, many of them would become revolutionists, and all would have 
the right to do so. The indictment that hangs over society is that of "exploiting labor." 
"Workmen" it is said, "are regularly robbed of what they produce. This is done within the 
forms of law, and by the natural working of competition." If this charge were proved, 
every right-minded man should become a socialist; and his zeal in transforming the 
industrial system would then measure and express his sense of justice (Clark, 1908). 
Hence Clark endorsed capitalism as long as everyone receives the amount that they 
produce, and if that’s not the case then the society would shift to socialism.  
The role of technological change 
While most of the scholastic writers considered workers as an impetus for change, 
Joseph Schumpeter believed that it was driven by an innovator. In Capitalism, Socialism 
and Democracy Schumpeter describes capitalists as rent-seeking entrepreneurs, whose 
goal is to maximize profits. To do that they can either lower the costs of labor or capital 
involved in production of the commodity, which might give them a comparative 
advantage in the short term, or innovate, which would enable them to increase their 
productivity at the lower cost and potentially allow for a higher price markup. Radical 
innovations might offer a firm long-term leverage over others as the commodity might be 
protected by patents or be difficult to imitate, hence allowing successful entrepreneurs to 
enjoy monopoly profits. However, Schumpeter himself drew a distinction between 
innovation and invention, suggesting that the latter implies a creation of something 
unique and new to the world, while the former includes commercialization of already 
existing knowledge. More importantly, radical innovation has a potential to reform the 
whole market, encouraging companies to compete in pursuit of gaining or maintaining 
their market share. In Schumpeter’s words “[innovation] strikes not at the margins of the 
profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundation, at their very lives.” 
While the consumers might be charged monopoly price or a price higher than in perfect 
competition, they also will be able to enjoy higher standards of living and derive higher 
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utility from the commodities they use. Moreover, because innovation is a continuous 
process, the entrepreneur will only be able to maintain his monopoly power until 
someone outperforms him, implying that the benefits of the monopoly profits change 
hands in a short time.  
As mentioned, Schumpeter did not believe in economic sustainability, and 
suggested that growth could only be supported by the disruption of status quo. However, 
his explanations of the existing income inequality were brief. In the Schumpeterian 
model, innovation drives economic growth. Innovative countries enjoy higher rates of 
economic growth and thus encourage less developed countries to put more emphasis on 
research and development. Eventually all economies would converge at a steady rate of 
economic growth that would equal the world technology growth rate.  
Robert Solow further built on Schumpeter’s model to explain unequal economic 
development using innovation. Using a standard production function, he derived that 
economic growth is determined by capital, labor, and total factor productivity (TFP), 
which encapsulated technological progress and efficiency improvement. Solow’s model 
of economic growth states that in the short run, a country’s growth rate is dependent on 
investment, depreciation, and population growth rates; however, due to diminishing 
marginal returns on labor and capital economic growth is bound to extinguish in the long 
run (Solow, 1956). This economic slowdown causes cross-border convergence of 
income, suggesting that with time poor states will achieve the same levels of economic 
development as rich states. Similarly, regional convergence occurs once the market 
forces eliminate temporary misallocation of factors of production. Furthermore, Solow 
specified that convergence is conditional on the equivalent education, institutional 
arrangements, and free market exchange. Based on the model, TFP is the only factor that 
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has no upper limit and does not depreciate with time, hence long term economic growth 
can only be sustained by innovation (Solow, 1956). While the reality did not seem to 
always align with Solow’s theory1, it has significantly contributed to our understanding 
of the importance of a country’s innovation capacity.  
Nicholas Kaldor believed that Solow’s model did not adequately explain cross-
cultural differences in economic growth levels, as developing countries were still behind 
the developed ones due to the low quality of infrastructure. Kaldor showed a significant 
positive correlation between the growth of the manufacturing sector and economic 
growth, which undermined Solow’s assumption of diminishing marginal returns on 
capital and gave rise to Kaldor’s laws of growth. He observed that a rise in investment 
could closely explain the productivity factor in OECD countries, suggesting that while 
investment fosters economic growth, it is only affordable to the richer class of the 
population that has enough disposable income to save and invest, thereby suggesting that 
inequality fuels growth (Kaldor, 1961).  
The inequality-growth relationship was further developed by Simon Kuznets, who 
compared income disparities in the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom 
from 1880 to 1947. He found that income inequality increased as a society was moving 
towards a manufacture-driven development, then it peaked for several years after 
industrialization, and then decreased over time (Kuznets, 1955). This finding was quite 
surprising to Kuznets himself, who expected that:  
Other conditions being equal, the cumulative effect of such inequality in savings would 
be the concentration of an increasing proportion of income-yielding assets in the hands of 
                                                             
1 For example, increased investment and penetration of information technology, though was expected to 
boost productivity based on the Solow’s model, has achieved the opposite effect, also known as Solow 
Computer Paradox. See Brynjolfsso (1993). 
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upper groups – a basis for larger income shares of these groups and their descendants 
(Kuznets, 1955). 
To fill in the gap between data and theory, Kuznets postulated that with time and 
patience, economic growth will trickle down to the poor class, and the income gap will 
shrink, suggesting that the relationship between income and inequality would trace an 
inverted-U shape. Kuznets speculated that the pattern observed results from the country’s 
transition from primarily agriculture-driven to manufacture-driven economic 
development (Kuznets, 1995). Though the data from Western European countries has 
supported Kuznets’s hypothesis, Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) argued that the same 
pattern is not replicated in Asia, where the economies start off with initially low levels of 
inequality, but then experience miracle growth and rapidly produce high levels of output. 
Based on this incongruence, the scholars have devised a political economy theory of the 
Kuznets curve, and suggested that the inverted-U relationship between inequality and 
growth is mediated by the implementation of political reforms. When the benefits of 
economic development are not equally distributed across the population, social unrest 
pressures the governments to implement redistributive reforms. Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2002) proposed that in East Asia, where the economies started off with low levels of 
income inequality and rapidly achieved high levels of economic growth, the rise in 
average per capita income has discouraged the population from initiating political 
transition of power from rich to poor.  
Francois Perroux was also skeptical of regional convergence, hence he relied on 
Schumpeter’s idea of propulsive entrepreneurs that revolutionize the industry with 
commercialization of novel ideas. Perroux was a regional economist, so he was interested 
in the influence of the interdependence of firms on economic development. He posits:   
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(…) growth does not appear everywhere and all at once; it appears in points or growth 
poles with variable intensities; it spreads along diverse channels and has varying terminal 
effects for the whole of the economy (Perroux 1950, as cited by Parr, 1999). 
A growth pole is a large firm that is interdependent with other firms in the 
industry, but can influence the course of development through its innovative capacity and 
market share. Perroux suggested the more connected firms are in the industry, the more 
polarized regional growth is. The region that has the highest concentration of growth 
poles is dominant, and is expected to be more technologically advanced, due to the 
innovation from the growth poles, and wealthier due to increased investment in the 
development of the region (Parr, 1999). Furthermore, Perroux considered that a dominant 
region to be essential for higher economic development and higher income (Speakman & 
Koivisto, 2013). The main drawback of the theory is that it does not explain how poor 
regions that are not capital-intensive can catch up with economic development of the 
dominant regions in terms of socio-economic wellbeing.  
While divergent in many ways, the aforementioned economists supported the idea 
that capital accumulation is at the core of economic development. Smith advocated 
minimal government intervention, and allowing market forces to redistribute resources 
across the population. Ricardo analyzed potential hindrances to capital accumulation and 
proposed that technological advancement might prevent stagnation by lowering rents and 
raising profits, thereby raising worker’s wages above sustenance pay. Bastiat firmly 
believed that inequality is a part of the natural order. He argued that increasing profits of 
capitalists will eventually benefit the lower class by lowering the interest rate; this 
argument was later refuted by proponents of socialism, who suggested that the lower 
class receives little benefit from the enrichment of the richer class. Mill argued that 
economic progress fails to benefit all members of society, and suggested that economies 
should rely on technological advancement to maximize productivity and allow workers to 
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have more spare time, that would give rise to a stationary but virtuous society. Like Mill, 
Hodgskin despised idle earners, and wanted wealth to be concentrated in the hands of its 
creators, workers themselves. He defined progress of accumulation of knowledge, rather 
than capital. Marx took Hodgskin’s theory a step further, and affirmed that capitalists will 
not be satisfied until all the markets have been exploited. He admitted that the spread of 
capitalism is important to dismantle the rule of self-sufficiency and natural economies in 
non-capitalist countries, but construed that in the long run capitalism will be replaced by 
a desire for a fairer society. Luxemburg extended Marxist theories by affirming that 
capitalism and socialism cannot coexist, such that socialism cannot be brought to fore if 
capitalism still exists. Clark and Marshal approached Hodgskin’s ideas from the 
perspective of marginal utility, and highlighted that individual’s utility will be satisfied as 
long as he receives the fruit of his work; if this cannot be achieved, society should shift to 
socialism. The importance of technological development has been highlighted by many 
classical economists. Schumpeter articulated its disruptive potential to revolutionize 
industry and foster economic growth. Solow then took this idea further suggesting that 
the country’s innovative capacity is a main determinant of its long run economic growth. 
Furthermore, he hinted on the potential of the spillover of technological knowledge to 
stimulate convergence of economic development across borders. This idea was later 
developed in the regional context by Perroux, who illustrated how diffusion of 
knowledge from innovation clusters can benefit other regions that do not possess the 
same level of economic capability.  
Contemporary theories  
Developmental economists drew inspiration from the theories mentioned above to 
derive reforms that aim to assist developing countries achieve sustainable economic 
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development and high living standards. The factors that have a potential of lessening 
income disparity are often the same as the ones that set some countries behind. Hence, 
this section reviews the theories put forth by the key developmental economists, and 
integrates their relation to various types of income inequality in China.  
Dual economy theory  
Arthur Lewis is widely-recognized as a founder of developmental economics, 
whose dual-economy theory was a breakthrough in understanding the development 
process of low-income countries. Lewis suggested that developing countries struggle to 
catch up because they have not fully embraced the dogmas of capitalism, which implied 
that the neoclassical marginal productivity theory of distribution fails to explain 
economic development of less advanced countries. 
Lewis divided the economy into two sectors: traditional (labor intensive) and 
modern (capital intensive). The central assumption of the model was based on Lewis’s 
observation of a rural-urban relationship. Rural wages were expected to go up, as the 
migration to urban areas has increased, however they did not change. Lewis explained 
that the surplus of labor in agricultural sector reduces its productivity, and thereby the 
wages of the workers (Lewis, 1979). The dual economy model assumes that the 
education level, and the innate skills of workers are the same in both sectors, hence the 
difference in wages is explained on productivity as a function of working experience. The 
traditional sector does not incentivize the workers to be productive, hence they acquire 
little knowledge, and receive subsistence wage (Lewis, 1954), while in the modern sector 
the worker can move up the career ladder as he gains more experience, thereby increasing 
the wage he receives. The modern sector has limited absorptive capacity, thus the 
mobility of labor across sectors is restricted. Lewis therefore proposed that savings, 
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investment, and technological advancement of the modern sector is the key element of 
the economic development of the economy. In the process of expansion modern, the 
sector will innovate and invest in infrastructure, and these benefits will eventually spill 
over to the traditional sector, however the income disparity between the workers will not 
cease to exist. Lewis proposed that adoption of capitalism would eliminate the surplus of 
labor in the traditional sector and achieve convergence of incomes between urban and 
rural sectors (Lewis, 1979). Some scholars suggest that the predicted pattern of 
development was observed in China, whereby adoption of capitalist ideology has 
increased the rise of wages of rural workers, thus eliminating the existing surplus of labor 
involved in traditional sector (Khan, 2014). 
The dual economy model emphasizes the lack of convergence between different 
sectors of the economy. While dividing it only in two sectors might paint a more 
simplistic picture, the general framework explains the continuous effect of market 
imperfections in exacerbating income inequality.  
Structuralism  
Raul Prebish was the first to suggest that developed economies like the US are at 
the center of global economic development, while the other countries are at the periphery. 
Referring back to classical economists, he underscored that the technological process is a 
key factor for economic growth of the nation. His theory explored how trade between 
central and peripheral economies affects a country’s course of innovation and its living 
standards. Prebish observed that innovation in the developed countries aims to improve 
economic efficiency by raising the standards of living of its labor force, as knowledge is 
their greatest export. In contrast, developing countries are competing for competitive 
advantage by lowering the price of raw materials that are used to manufacture the 
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products invented by central economies. This constitutes the foundation of the 
dependency theory – while education and technological capital are identical in both 
developing and developed countries, due to the lack of a clear development strategy the 
former are forced into supplying cheap capital and labor to the latter, which enables 
central countries to charge higher prices for the goods they have produced using materials 
from the countries at the periphery. The disparity in the revenue creates inequality 
between countries, whereby developing countries cannot enjoy the benefits of improved 
productivity, and therefore, catch up. The theory suggests that the forces that allow 
central economies to advance also stall the development of the countries at the periphery, 
meaning that growth of the advanced economies depends on the misery of less developed 
ones. Prebish suggested that developing countries should heavily rely on the imports of 
technological capital from abroad to absorb technological knowledge from developed 
economies, and implement protectionist policies to ensure sufficient demand for locally 
manufactured goods. 
While Prebish stressed that the power difference between highly developed and 
developing countries can be resolved using capitalist approach, Andre Gunter Frank 
suggested that there is no universal solution to balance out the asymmetry of power, 
rather it depends on the socioeconomic forces of each developing country. In contrast to 
Lewis’ model of economic growth, Frank believed that proximity to developed countries 
does not facilitate the spillover of technological capital, rather it widens inequality 
between them, thus replicating the path of advanced economies will not lift up the 
developing ones. He hypothesized that the rate of economic growth in the peripheral 
countries is the highest when the contact with central countries is weakened through wars 
or trade regulations. Frank suggested that regional inequalities in the developing 
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countries result from a similar exploitative relationship, whereby stronger regions or 
regional centers take advantage of the surplus of the factors of production in the less 
developed regions. Contrary to Frank’s prediction, Khan (2014) cites evidence that 
adopting successful capitalist strategies brings significant progress for a developing 
economy.  
The theory stresses that lagging economic growth is not a result of lack of education and 
scientific knowledge, rather the inability of dependent economies to determine their own 
path to sustainable development due to being forced into supplying cheap raw materials 
and labor (Ferraro, 2008). 
In short, Prebisch was one of the first economists to capture the imbalance of 
power in international trade. He suggested that developing economies should focus on 
achieving higher productive efficiency using technological knowledge of rich economies, 
and ensure sufficient local market demand for locally produced goods by implementing 
import quotas on everything, but technology. Dependency theory was widely criticized 
for not taking into account competition that could boost productive and innovative 
capability of the developing country, such that they would be able to lessen their 
dependency on imports and increase export revenue (Bigsten, 1983). 
 General discussion 
 Though economists differ in their theories of development and solutions to market 
inefficiency, most agree on antipathy to income inequality. Increasing disparity between 
income levels is viewed as unjust (e.g. Ricardo, Hodgskin, Marx, Luxemberg, et al.), and 
self-perpetuating (e.g. Lewis, Prebisch, et al.). Smith presents inequality of income as a 
failure of the invisible hand to allocate resources efficiently, while others emphasize the 
inequality of opportunity due to lack of education (e.g. Thompson, Mill) or opportunity 
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(e.g. Hodgskin, Frank). The central aversive property of inequality lies not in the lack of 
market power of the impoverished individuals, but rather in its ability to undermine social 
cohesion that leads to the collapse of the entire economic system, which pushes society to 
implement socialist rule. The literature review highlights the prospect of innovation and 
technological advancement to facilitate a fairer distribution of income by improving 
efficiency of the market (e.g. Schumpeter, Solow, Perroux, Prebisch, et al.), and enabling 
disadvantaged individuals and regions to catch up (e.g. Mill).  
 While I do agree with the revolutionary power of innovation and technological 
advancement, the influence of institutions and existing economic and political structures 
cannot be ignored. The following research aims to provide empirical evidence for the 
effects of application of Perroux’s growth pole theory in China, highlighting that regional 
convergence of income, as well as the diffusion of knowledge, is obstructed by fiscal 
decentralization that encourages competition between provinces as a way of achieving 
higher economic growth.  
3. Rise of inequality in Post-Maoist China 
The rise of socialism in China  
As per Marx’s prediction, the beginning of 20th century was characterized by the 
uprising of the proletariat to overthrow the oppression of the bourgeoisie in favor of 
socialism. The success of the Russian October Revolution coincided with Chinese 
dissatisfaction with the imperialist rule of Japan and Britain and pursuit of independent 
path to development (Ping, 2009). Lenin’s principles of “complete equality of rights for 
all nations; the right of nations to self-determination; the amalgamation of the workers of 
all nations” (Lenin, 1914 as cited in Rouček, 1961, p.171) have found its manifestation in 
the establishment of Chinese Communist Party in 1921. Having received support from 
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Soviet Union, China has embarked on its anti-feudalism and anti-imperialist Civil War 
(1927-1950) that established the rule of Communist Party. Before 1949, China’s relations 
with the world evolved around China’s pursuit of sovereignty and war, while after the 
foundation of the People’s Republic of China, the focus has shifted to empowering and 
solidifying its role in the world as a powerful socialist country. The political and 
economic development of China in the 20th century provides a different perspective on 
Luxemburg’s theory, underscoring that she underestimated the role of national conflict 
between Eastern and Western societies. As Ping (2009) highlights, the 20th century was 
defined by China’s successful attempt to gain control over its economic development, 
that challenged Luxemburg’s view of global dominance of capitalism. Contrary to 
Luxemburg’s prediction, China in the 20th century has proven its ability to gain weight in 
the world, while being a socialist country.  
Under the rule of Mao Tse-tung (1949-1976), China’s focus was on economic and 
political self-reliance, which ultimately led to excessive investment in national defense 
and implementation of a series of protectionist policies that stagnated the country’s 
technological development. After the death of Mao, Deng Xiaoping started China’s 
transition from socialism to “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” a transition to a 
market economy under the control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The transition 
to a market-oriented economy meant moving towards a more unequal distribution of 
income, which went against people’s expectations and ideals, thus creating fertile ground 
for social unrest, and a greater divide among people. The current state of regional 
inequality in China has emerged due to the combination of powerful forces of history, 
geography, state, and globalization. Before the implementation of the Xiaoping’s 
economic reforms, China’s society was exemplarily equal, hence examining the 
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emergence of material inequality in China provides profound insight into the processes 
that exacerbate and create inequality of wealth. 
  In the early 1980s China’s infrastructure and technological capital was too weak to 
compete with other countries. Thus, the series of Chinese Economic Reforms, also 
known as the open door policy, meant to absorb technological knowledge from 
multinational companies (Harbody, 1995). In contrast to the “shock therapy” of Eastern 
Europe, China’s transition was gradual, whereby at first foreign investment was allowed 
only in Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Southern China, and later gradually expanded 
to the Eastern regions. Contrary to Mao’s redistributive policies that aimed at 
convergence of regional economies, Deng put forth the idea of efficiency-oriented 
economic development that is guided by the principle of regional comparative advantage. 
The Seventh Five Year Plan (FYP) put forth the idea of “three economic belts” (sanjia 
jingji didai) that outlined the principle of comparative advantage that guided the 
economic development of the regions. Due to favorable location that allowed closer 
proximity to ports and ocean, the Coastal region was put in charge of export-oriented 
industrialization and active participation in international market, the Central region 
oversaw agriculture, and Western region managed the mining industry (Fan, 1997). 
Naturally, this strategy raised many concerns due to its potential to create large income 
disparities between regions to which Deng Xiaoping infamously said: “let some people 
get rich first.” The reform was rooted in a Chinese version of growth pole theory, called 
ladder step theory (tidu lilun) that stated that China, as a large developing country, should 
not focus on the overall development, and should rather concentrate its resources in 
Coastal regions, as they are more likely to attract foreign investment and advance 
technologically. The country was told that the focus of economic policies would then 
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gradually shift to the Inland and Western regions of China. This theory then gave a rise to 
“anti-ladder step theory,” which was ironically proposed by economists from Western 
China, who perceived focus on the coastal regions as discriminating against Western 
China that was better endowed with natural resources. The scholars argued that 
favoritism of the Coast forced Inland regions into economic backwardness (Holbig, 
2004). There is little empirical evidence in support of ladder step theory, while more 
scholars suggest that the first-mover advantage of coastal provinces was the impetus for 
the increasing between region inequality (Yueh, 2009; Granneman & Dijk, 2015). 
Coastal provinces still have a significant geographical advantage over the inland 
provinces, and, consequently, receive more foreign investment that sets them apart from 
other provinces in the country (Kanbur & Zhang, 2005). Figure 1 visually demonstrates 
that, although the reforms have been implemented more than a decade ago, innovative 
activity is still largely concentrated in the coastal regions. When compared to Figure 2 
that shows geographical distribution of per capita income, it is easy to notice that 
provinces that are responsible for the larger share of economic activity are also the 
richest.  
Figure 1. Regional Distribution of Innovation Clusters (CIC) in China 
Source: Yu, W., Hong, J., Zhu, Y., Marinova, D., & Guo, X. (2014). Creative industry clusters, regional innovation, 
and economic growth in China. Regional Science Policy & Practice, 6(4), 329-347. 
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A rapid increase in income 
inequality created a cognitive dissonance in 
Chinese society that continued proclaiming 
social equality, while benefitting a small 
segment of the population. China became 
divided not only culturally, but 
economically, as well as socially, which 
served as a perfect recipe for social unrest. 
The Chinese government has been taking 
measures to reduce interprovincial income 
inequality. The Ninth FYP (1996-2000) 
aimed to reduce regional inequality due to 
its potential threat to undermine China’s 
prosperity and unity, hence it put forth 
policies that encouraged interregional 
cooperation. Consequently, the “Western 
Development Program” was launched in 
1999 to stimulate economic growth in the 
Western region of the country. Then in 2003 the “Reviving Northeastern Region” was 
implemented to raise the level of industrial development in the northeastern provinces. 
Qin & Chong (2016) show that the efforts of Chinese government were rather 
unsuccessful in alleviating poverty in the targeted regions.  Granneman & Dijk (2015) 
present evidence showing that from 1990 until 2012 more than 70% of FDI was allocated 
to the coastal provinces creating disparity in the levels of economic growth and 
Source: Herrerias, M., & Ordoñez, J. (2012). New 
evidence on the role of regional clusters and 
convergence in China (1952–2008). China Economic 
Review, 23(4), 1120-113 
Figure 2. Geographical Distribution of 
Income, 1952 and 2008. 
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development between regions. This evidence demonstrates that, although the country-
level income distribution has been slowly becoming more equal, interprovincial 
inequality that resulted from regional favoritism persists.  
Orthodox socialist countries share a tendency of centralization of financial 
systems, such that the central government decides on the allocation of resources in the 
regions of the country. China has started to move away from a centralized approach in the 
late 1950th, by putting local governments in charge of budgeting, resource distribution, 
and stimulation of economic growth. Fiscal decentralization provides the central 
government with clear and accurate evaluation of needs and demands of local population, 
allowing them to adjust policies to the diverse needs of local population. Decentralization 
allowed a great deal of flexibility and adaptability in terms of resource allocation, which 
was presumed to lead to more fair and efficient growth. The performance of the local 
government officials was then evaluated by the state, which resulted in falsification of the 
data reports, rampant corruption, and further inequality (Wei, 2006; Zhang, 2006). Zhang 
(2006) has examined the role of fiscal decentralization for unequal of provision of public 
goods and services across provinces. As the size of the local governments in a province is 
fixed, poor provinces spend the larger share of government revenue on salaries of 
government employees, which results in underdeveloped infrastructure, which then 
drives away investment (Zhang, 2006). Zhang’s work (2006) also raises an important 
question of quality of government staff, who tend to be more concerned with meeting the 
targets of CCP, often just on paper, to receive the promotion. Thus, Zhang (2006) 
proposes to reduce the size of local governments, especially in the Western and Middle 
regions that rely on agriculture as a main source of revenue. Wei (2006) also suggests 
that the lack of centralized control and inequality of economic growth across regions 
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undermines social cohesion of the country, which may lead to separation of culturally 
distinct regions, like Xinjiang and Tibet. While the central government has implemented 
strict control of movements for independence in those regions, and is tightly monitoring 
the presence of any revolutionary activity in the regions, there is an obvious need for 
unity that cannot be achieved under unequal rates of economic development.  
 Apart from the regional divide, there is a clear separation between rural and urban 
China to the extent that scholars often treat the two sectors as two distinct economies 
(Wang, 2008). While this paper does not separate the two concepts, it is important to 
understand the forces that cause income inequality within the provinces to analyze the 
interactions between the provinces and regions. The unequal process of industrialization 
is believed to handle the urban vs rural divide, whereby rural China was primarily used as 
a source of raw materials, and received a lower compensation; urban China handled the 
manufacturing of industrial goods, and hence was able to reap higher profits. The divide 
between rural and urban areas resembles that described the in dual economy model, 
whereby the workers in both sectors not only are compensated differently for the same 
amount of work, but their mobility is restricted by a strict household registration system. 
Liu & Dai (2014) used the Theil index to evaluate the influence of urban versus rural 
inequality on the consumer demand among rural citizens. The results showed a 
significant and negative impact of existing inequality on consumption of rural residents. 
Furthermore, Yu (2013) used household data in several provinces to examine the 
determinants of poverty. The research highlights a drastic gap between urban and rural 
provinces in terms of human capital and development, showing that rural poverty rates 
are on average 1.5 times higher than those of urban provinces. However, interestingly, 
rural-oriented government policies that were implemented during 2006-2009 have 
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significantly improved the income gap between rural and urban citizens (Liu & Dai, 
2014). 
Over the past three decades China has achieved a tremendous economic 
development, making it one of the strongest economies in the world. However, its 
socialist past brought challenges such as within- and between-province inequality. 
Transitioning from a planned economy to socialism with Chinese characteristics has 
redefined the roles of state and local governments in economic development, and 
encouraged regional development based on the provincial competitive advantage. While 
the deviation from socialist principles was expected to result in increased income 
disparity, allowing incentivizing individuals based on their contribution, evidence 
suggests that regional favoritism combined with restricted migration has worsened the 
divide. Increased economic development of the Eastern regions came at the cost of 
regional and urban-rural inequality.  
 From a macro-level perspective, the rise of income inequality accompanied by 
miraculous economic growth closely follows Kuznet’s inverted-U hypothesis, suggesting 
that labor force growth, labor specialization, and uneven access to technological capital 
are the main drivers behind the widening income gap. From a micro-level perspective, 
the distribution system has become more just, as people are rewarded based on their 
contribution to the economy, which is perceived favorably by Chinese citizens (Whyte, 
2010). The unfairness of income distribution stems from uneven regional capital, which 
creates disparity between income opportunities available for individuals (Whyte, 2010).  
Innovation in China  
Alas, China’s four great inventions (i.e. compass, gunpowder, papermaking, 
printing) are no longer associated with China’s innovation capacity. Although 
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increasingly more scholars and political figures highlight the immense potential China 
has to become the world’s leading innovator, the majority still believe that cultural and 
political forces greatly inhibit the country’s innovative capability, making it less suitable 
for competition with the innovators from the West (Awate, Larsen, & Mudambi, 2014; 
Farmer, Tierney, & Kung – McIntyre, 2003). 
The 20th century was a relatively prosperous time for most Western economies 
that could enjoy the benefits of the industrial revolution. China, however, was stuck in 
what Mark Elvin, a historian, referred to as “a high equilibrium trap”- a situation in 
which the low cost of labor, and high market efficiency eliminated the incentive to invest 
in technological development (The Economist, 2015). Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform 
was an attempt to rapidly develop the economy by absorbing technological capital from 
other counties at the cost of cheap labor. As a result, investment-driven and export-led 
economic growth has not only improved living standards of millions of people that were 
lifted from poverty, but also made China the richest economy in the world based on GDP 
on a PPP-adjusted basis (IMF, 2016). Some sources argue that China is past its prime, as 
it no longer holds a competitive advantage over other developing countries, which led to 
decelerated economic growth and social unrest.  
Low costs of factors of production and educated human capital allowed the 
country to gain a competitive advantage over other South East Asian countries, coining 
the term “China’s price.” At the same time, the term “China’s quality” does not have a 
positive connotation, and is mostly referring to the country’s inability to innovate 
independently and guarantee products of a higher standard. Harbody (1995) suggests that 
at the time of implementation of the open door policy, China focused on absorbing 
technological knowledge through imitation, rather than innovation, which could have 
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been achieved if Chinese decided to collaborate with multinational companies (MNCs) 
and jointly produce commodities. However, Hu (2015) suggests that the indicators that 
are commonly used to quantify innovation, such as patent filings, are not necessarily 
indicative of China’s technological potential. As China was lagging for so many years, 
the technological insights absorbed from MNCs created a solid foundation for the future 
innovations to come. These insights were a determining factor for rapid economic growth 
and diffusion of knowledge. Namely, Cheung and Lin (2004) provide evidence for a 
positive and significant effect of FDI on patent applications, suggesting that technological 
knowledge spills over to the domestic enterprises stimulating innovation.  
Technological upgrades, rising living standards, greater market share, and foreign 
investment have secured China’s position in the global economy. However, to advance 
further the country needs to innovate autonomously, prioritizing indigenous innovation 
(Wu, 2013). China is slowly starting the process of transformation to the innovation-
driven growth that might not offer high surges in GDP, rather will promote greater 
stability, market share in the world economy, and sustainable economic development (Fu 
& Mu, 2014).  
This paper examines the role of innovation and its spillovers on interregional 
inequality in China. Due to the low costs of information transfer and ever-improving 
infrastructure, I expect that innovations in the knowledge-intensive regions will disrupt 
profitability of inefficient industries in other regions, resulting in higher overall 
productivity and lower between-province inequality, as regions will be given equal 
opportunities for development. As the literature underscores the spatial heterogeneity of 
innovation potential, the study also explores the possibility of spillover effects, that is to 
what extent innovation produced in other regions impacts income inequality between 
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provinces in a more distant region. The evidence of spillover effects would suggest that 
the ease of information flow allows for a faster diffusion of knowledge, and propose that 
the benefits of knowledge extends further than the place of its creation, potentially raising 
the standards of living in other provinces.  
4. Methodology 
a. Province as a unit of analysis 
This paper takes 31 provincial-level administrative divisions of China as separate 
units of analysis. While still under the supervision of the central government, local 
governments are in power to implement autonomous economic policies that are specific 
to each province, suggesting strong differences in innovation capabilities (Li, 2009). 
Furthermore, due to China’s rigorous household registration policy, also known as the 
“hukou system,2” labour mobility within the country is restricted. Hukou limits rural to 
urban migration by restricting employability, access to social services (for oneself and 
one’s children), and permission to purchase property, suggesting that regions that have 
significantly more developed urban areas (e.g. Eastern region) are more unequal than the 
regions that are more rural (e.g. Western region). Lastly, the differences between 
provinces also extend to the cultural heritage, and the language spoken. These 
considerations justify using province as an independent unit of analysis (Li, 2009).  
According to the previous research, the Coastal provinces are more likely to 
receive more foreign investment due to a favorable location, further enhancing a disparity 
between the innovation capability across and within regions (Fan, 2012; Yuan, 2005; Fan 
                                                             
2 In December 2015, Chinese government announced about potential reform to the hukou system that aims 
to relax the aforementioned restrictions. While the dataset covers the year of 2015, I presume that the time 
delay is too small to exert significant effects. 
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et al.,2012).Hence, the provinces are grouped into three regions to assess potential 
regional differences in economic development. 
b. Data 
This paper constructs the panel dataset by merging socio-economic variables at 
the provincial level from the China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC), 2000-2014), China Statistical Yearbook 
(NBSC, 2000-2014), and country-level macroeconomic variables from the World Bank 
World Development Index (WDI). The sample consists of 31 provinces using data from 
1995-2015, however the years in focus are 2000-2015. The variables and descriptive 
statistics are summarized in Table 1.  
Material status is a well-known indicator of economic prosperity and life 
satisfaction (Abbott, Wallace, Lin, & Haerpfer, 2015), especially in countries that 
underwent a series of transitional policies and have experienced rapid economic 
development (Abbott et al., 2015). However, an unequal distribution of wealth can 
undermine social cohesion and lower people’s life satisfaction (Abbot et al. 2015; Knight 
et al., 2009). The average household consumption expenditure serves as a proxy for the 
material living conditions in each province. The OECD (2013) suggests that 
consumption, income, and wealth are the determining factors of economic wellbeing, 
with consumption being the main proxy for one’s living standards. Higher consumption 
implies higher economic well-being, and vice versa, ceteris paribus. As Reich (1987) 
notes, while income and consumption are related, savings and one’s ability to borrow 
also influence the amount one spends on goods and services, therefore change in 
household expenditure is not equivalent to change in income levels. Moreover, Blundell 
& Preston (1996) highlight that while income fluctuates systematically, consumption 
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expenditure is more in line with household’s expected permanent income due to 
borrowing and saving ability. Therefore, the use of consumption can construct a more 
realistic depiction of one’s ability to satisfy basic needs and access to long run resources 
such as durable goods. However, some argue that differences in consumption may be due 
to individual differences in tastes and habits rather than access to resources, hence 
consumption expenditure might not be the best indicator of welfare (Gustaffson, Shi, & 
Sicular, 2008). 
The dependent variable is income inequality using the Theil index (𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑗,𝑡) or the 
Gini coefficient (𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗,𝑡). The Theil index belongs to the class of general entropy 
measures that estimates the deviations of income distributions within a category from 
perfect convergence, while the Gini coefficient compares the extent to which income 
distribution in a region deviates from perfect equality. Both measures satisfy Fields and 
Fei’s (1978) criteria for inequality, including scale irrelevance, symmetry, rank 
preserving equalization, and the principle of transfer. Thus, the results of using either 
measures can be used to make comparisons of income distributions across provinces. 
However, to achieve the most accurate representation of a country’s Lorenz curve, one 
needs to collect data on an individual level (Cowell, 2003). Consequently, as the data 
used in this paper is collected on an aggregate provincial level, the Theil index is used as 
the primary measure of income inequality between provinces, while Gini coefficient 
analysis is used for robustness, and can be presented on demand. 
The Theil index, also known as the mean logarithmic deviation, reflects the extent 
to which the distribution of income across groups is different from the distribution of 
population across groups. and is calculated as: 
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where 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑖 = Theil index for the region i;  
N = the number of provinces in the region i; 
𝑥𝑗 = the consumption expenditure per capita of a province j; 
𝜇𝑖 = the mean consumption expenditure per capita in region i; 
In contrast to the Gini coefficient, the Theil index does not rely on the 
equidistribution line, rather it reflects the extent to which income of a province is 
different from the average income in a region that the province belongs to. Perfect 
convergence is achieved when each province’s average income equals its share of the 
population, which defines the minimum value of the Theil index (zero) (Conceição, & 
Ferreira, 2000). If the province’s income is higher than the average income in the region, 
then its contribution to the value of the region’s Theil index is positive, and if the 
province’s income is lower than the regional average, then its contribution is negative 
(Conceição, & Ferreira, 2000). However, because the former is always higher than the 
latter, the value of the Theil index is always positive and ranges from zero (perfect 
equality) to infinity, with higher values representing higher degree of inequality 
(Blackburn, 1989). To ease interpretation of changes in the Theil index I have computed 
a log transformed value of the index, therefore regression coefficients can be interpreted 
as a percentage change in the Theil index as a result of a one unit increase in independent 
variable.  
The count of granted patents (𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑛𝑡𝑗,𝑡−3) is used as a measure of realized 
regional innovation performance. In order to distinguish between invention that is defined 
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as the creation of new knowledge from innovation that encapsulates commercialization of 
new ideas (Schumpeter, 1934), I apply a 3-year lag that is meant to capture the time lag 
associated with the exploitation of formal knowledge. Since China joined the World 
Trade Organization in 2001, it was forced to upgrade intellectual property laws to 
international standards. While a lot of skepticism regarding the extent of law enforcement 
remains (Yueh, 2009) and the quality of the patent data overall (Dang & Motohashi, 
2015; Grilches, 1990), researchers continue using the count of patents as a proxy for 
innovative output due to the plentitude of data readily available (Fan, 2012; Li, 2009). A 
common critique of patent data in China is that most of them are directly subsidized by 
the local governments, hence it encourages influx of patents that hold no economic or 
social value. However, Dang & Motohashi (2015) demonstrated that government support 
did not affect the quality or the quantity of patents in China. Moreover, research suggests 
that patent statistics serve as a significant predictor of financial performance of the 
province (Dang & Motohashi, 2015). 
NBSC categorizes domestic patents into the following groups: inventions 
(𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−3), design (𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑗,𝑡−3), and utility (𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑡−3) patents. Figure 3 
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demonstrates that the highest number of patents are granted for utility inventions. Utility 
patents reflect an adjustment, and improvement of the structural properties of the product, 
and are protected for 10 years, while invention patents are granted to the new technical 
proposals to the products or methods that often require a longer development time, and 
higher degree of novelty, granting its holder a monopoly power for the period of 20 
years. Li (2009) distinguishes invention and utility patents as “novel-to-the-world” and 
“novel-to-China” respectively. Design patents are awarded for the new external aesthetic 
properties of the product, and contain very little or no advancement of the technical 
properties of the product, thus are protected for 10 years only. These definitions also 
align with the categorization used in the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005) whereby design, 
utility, and invention patents represent marketing, process, and product innovations 
respectively. This study uses 3-year time lags to account for the time delay associated 
with the pendency period. While the patent remains under protection of the patent laws 
for at least 10 years, this paper assumes that it takes much less time for the product to be 
Figure 3. Average Number of Patents Granted by Region and Type. 
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integrated into the market and generate value, improving overall economic efficiency. 
Prior to the implementation of the Chinese economic reform in 1978, factories 
and firms in China had little incentive to innovate, and research institutions had little 
incentive to transfer new knowledge to the firms. Liu & White (2001) argue that even 
after the implementation of market reforms, universities and research institutions 
remained responsible for most of the invention and utility models patented, while firms 
started innovating just recently (Liu & White, 2001). The number of higher education 
institutions (𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑗,𝑡) as adjusted per 1000 residents in the population, is used as an 
additional proxy for innovation capabilities of the region. The role of universities in 
promoting economic growth has been previously examined in the context of knowledge 
spillover theory of entrepreneurship, in which the presence of education institutions is a 
valid predictor of the region’s capacity for producing knowledge and fostering the 
entrepreneurial spirit (Audretsch, Hülsbeck, & Lehmann, 2011; Audretsch, Keilbach, & 
Lehmann, 2007; Audretsch, Lehmann, & Warning, 2005). The theory proposes that the 
abundant supply of young educated human capital and potential spillovers of knowledge 
attract firms and companies to open their offices nearby (Audretsch & Belinski, 2013)  
This paper uses the number of private enterprises in a province per 1000 people 
(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑡) as a proxy for commercialization of the new knowledge and regional 
entrepreneurship. The rise of private firms can demonstrate the economic utility derived 
from the new knowledge generated (Audretsch, Hulsbeck, & Lehmann, 2011), which in 
turn fosters competitiveness of the province. Transition from a planned economy to a 
market economy has allowed entrepreneurs to focus on profits and efficiency, which has 
enhanced urbanization in China (Knight, & Song, 2008). However, Feng (2008) also 
highlights that the ownership type is a significant contributor to the existing income 
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inequality, whereby employees of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) earn significantly more 
than those employed in the private enterprises, especially when considering social 
welfare benefits. Private owners are often unable to compete with the compensation 
offered by SOEs, and hence are forced to innovate to stay open.  
The quality of human capital is an essential force behind innovation and 
sustainable economic growth. The OECD’s report on “The Well-being of Nations” 
defines human capital as “The knowledge, skills, competencies and attributes embodied 
in individuals that facilitate the creation of personal, social and economic well-being” 
(OECD, 2001). Fleicher, Li, & Zhao (2007) compared the relative impact of human 
capital, infrastructure development, and foreign direct investment on economic growth in 
China. They find that human capital has the most consistent and positive impact on 
economic growth (Fleicher et al, 2007). Moreover, their research concludes that 
investment in education is the most economically efficient way to reduce inequality 
between Western, Central, and Eastern China (Fleicher et al, 2007). However, the 
literature has not yet reached a consensus on the most optimal measure to assess the 
quality of human capital. Whalley and Zhao (2013) use educational expenditures, while 
Ximing, Sicular, & Gustafsson (2008) use average education level of a working adult. 
These measures fail to account for the skills acquired outside of school, such as job 
training. The struggle of finding an optimal measure lies not only in the ambiguous 
definition, but with the limited data available. This paper attempts to capture the quality 
of human capital by relying on the proportion of individuals in a province that have 
received a university degree, and spending on education, both government and private, 
expressed as a proportion of GDP.  
The current research utilizes data on university graduates calculated as a 
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proportion of the population (ℎ𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑗,𝑡) to capture local skilled labor force. Education is 
highly valued in the Chinese culture, such that access to good education can be a ticket to 
a higher quality of life. Andergassen & Nardini (2007) demonstrate the ability of 
education to decrease inequality through redistributing income from the rich to the poor. 
Ximing, Sicular, & Gustafsson (2008) conducted a regression-based inequality 
decomposition to determine the factors that influence income inequality in China. They 
analyzed household data from the 1995 through 2002 to understand which variables 
contributed to the existing income inequality during those years. Interestingly, in 1995 
education had a negative impact on the existing income inequality, however, by 2002 it 
worsened income inequality. According to Ximing, Sicular, & Gustafsson, (2008), 
education explains one-third of existing income inequality, suggesting that value of 
education in the job market has increased, which, in turn, widened the gap between those 
who pursued it and those who did not. 
The state’s involvement in setting educational standards is a key indicator of 
quality of the overall educational system (López-Claros & Mata, 2010). Sylwester (2002) 
estimated that increased investment in public education consistently lowered income 
inequality ratings in East Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Hence, this study uses 
educational funds expressed as a percent of total GRP (𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑗,𝑡−3) that encompass 
both private and government investment in education. Over the years, the Chinese 
government has demonstrated its commitment to improve the quality of public education 
through rapid increase in average per-capita expenditure (Wang & Zhao, 2014), however 
between-region differences still exist. As of 2005, between-region inequality accounted 
for 47.3 % of variation in per-pupil education expenditure, whereby provinces in Eastern 
China (e.g. Shanghai) spend almost 10 times more than provinces in Central China (e.g. 
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Hunan) and the gap is growing over the years (Wang & Zhao, 2014). This study assumes 
than the widening gap in access to quality education is a significant contributor to 
between-province income inequality. As with patents, I presume that investment in 
education does not have an instantaneous effect, hence the study employs a 3-year lag to 
account for delayed time effects. A 3-year time-lag was chosen as the average length of 
school cycle is 3 years.  
As suggested by López-Claros & Mata (2010), higher access to medical services 
allows more individuals to be active participants in the development process, be 
employed, generate economic value, and innovate. Moreover, access to basic education 
and health resources are the important factors that determine life opportunities available 
for an individual (Sen, 1999). This paper includes health worker density (𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑗,𝑡) 
that is measured as the number of health workers available per 1000 residents in the 
population to account for differences in access to medical resources between provinces. 
China’s access to healthcare and education has increased tremendously since the 
implementation of the market reform (Li, 2012), as seen by the increasing number of 
health workers, and education institutions available (Figure 4). 
Xie & Jin (2015) recently found more evidence in support of Piketty’s hypothesis, 
suggesting that housing assets account for almost 70% of wealth in China, making 
property-holders the richest class in the country. They further argue that housing prices 
are highly skewed towards the Eastern region due to its favorable location, higher rates of 
economic growth, and perceived employment opportunities (Xin & Jin, 2015). Due to the 
unavailability of residential property prices, this paper utilizes log transformed average 
selling price for commercial buildings (ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡) as a proxy for the ease and cost of 
doing business. As expected, cost of commercial property was strongly associated with 
44 
 
innovative activity, thus it is used as an instrumental variable for innovation. 
Infrastructure is a crucial factor for a country’s economic growth, as it stimulates 
foreign direct investment, thereby increasing a country’s productivity and strengthening 
its position in the global market. Fisher & Chen (1996) stressed that higher government 
investment in infrastructure is one of the main reasons behind the disparity in factor 
productivity between the coastal and the inland regions in China. They suggest that better 
infrastructure not only encourages investment, but also leads to higher retention of talent, 
which then results in higher economic growth. Fan & Zhang (2004) used data from 
China’s Agricultural Census to analyze inequality between urban and rural areas, and 
confirmed that allocation of infrastructure and public capital explains most of disparity in 
production efficiency and regional equity. The variable 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑗,𝑡 is measured as the 
proportion of highways and railways in a province j. As the variable is strongly correlated 
to the number of patents granted and a relatively weak correlation with a natural log of 
Theil Index, it is used as an instrumental variable to capture innovative activity in a 
province j.  
Figure 4. Density of Health Workers and Higher Education Institutions, 2000-2015. 
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As a proxy for adoption of information and communication technologies, this 
paper uses the count of fixed telephone subscribers (𝑓𝑠𝑏𝑠⁡𝑗,𝑡−3) and the count of mobile 
telephone subscribers (𝑓𝑠𝑏𝑠⁡𝑗,𝑡−3) per 1000 residents in a province. These variables 
turned out to be highly correlated, hence only the latter was used in the study to avoid 
multicollinearity. The importance of telecommunication technology has been widely 
discussed in the economic literature (Leff, 1984; Levendis & Lee, 2012) due to its ability 
to decrease the costs of information exchange and positive impact on national income 
(Leff, 1984). Levendis & Lee (2012) provide evidence in favor of endogenous growth 
theory, stating that regardless of whether the effect of telecommunications is endogenous 
or exogenous, increased teledensity has significant and positive effects on economic 
growth. To account for potential delays in the effect of increasing access to information 
and telecommunication technology, this study imposes a 3-year lag.  
Inflation (𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑗,𝑡)  is calculated at the provincial level using a year-to-year change 
in CPI. Interest rate spread (𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡) stands for the difference between the interest rate 
charged to borrowers and the interest rate paid to depositors. While the greater interest 
rate spread demonstrates that the cost of borrowing is significantly higher than the benefit 
of saving, implicating greater income inequality, it also reflects efficiency of financial 
institutions; thus, higher interest rate spread indicates of lack of financial structural 
development. Due to the unavailability of data at the provincial level, the current study 
utilizes country-level calculations of interest rate spread offered by the World Bank, and 
assumes that it applies evenly to each province across years.  
The relationship between income inequality and the savings rate has been widely 
discussed in academic literature. The permanent income hypothesis developed by Milton 
Friedman states that the expectation of future income determines individual’s current 
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consumption, such that unforeseen gains will increase savings to compensate for an 
anticipation of negative shocks to income that lie ahead (Freidman, 1957, as cited in 
Dynan, Skinner, & Zeldes, 2004). Using a wide range of data sources, Dynan, et al. 
(2004) tested to what extent the current state of economy follows the expected trend. 
Their results suggest that high-income households consistently save a larger portion of 
their income than low-income households. Alvarez-Cuadrado & El-Attar Vilalta (2012) 
built on the existing research suggesting that high-inequality regions are characterized by 
lower rates of savings when compared to regions with more even income distribution. 
They propose that households tend to evaluate their income level in relation to other 
households in the region, hence, when inequality is high poor and middle class families 
tend to decrease savings and increase spending to protect their social status (Alvarex-
Cuadrado, & El-Attar Vilalta, 2012). Unfortunately, the regional data on disposable 
income was rather sporadic, hence to approximate provincial average savings rate, this 
paper uses a natural log of saving deposits in the central bank of China (𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑗,𝑡). 
Yang & Qiu (2016) modelled the impact of education on intergenerational mobility of 
income, and proposed that the more parents invest in the education of their children, the 
more likely they are to earn higher income in the future. However, their results, in 
combination with Alvarez-Cuadrado & El-Attar Vilalta (2012), suggest that increased 
savings exasperate income inequality at least in short run, as those that do not save will 
not pass down their income to their children, are unable to earn returns on their 
investment, and cannot secure themselves from temporary fluctuations of income. 
As suggested by Li (2009), the annual change in real Gross Regional Product 
(GRP) per capita (𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑗,𝑡)⁡is used to capture the income fluctuations in the provincial 
economy, and the ability of the residents to realize the economic value of knowledge 
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generated. As migration to urban areas is restricted, the urban unemployment rate 
(𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑗,𝑡−3⁡) is meant to capture the mismatch between the supply and demand for 
labor in the urban areas. 3-year lag is applied to the variable to control for delayed 
effects.  
Inherited from the Soviet Union, China’s Five-Year Plans (FYP) do not only 
indicate the direction of economic development that the country is going to undertake, 
but also dictate the potential reforms that need to be implemented on both regional and 
national level. The current dataset encompasses the Tenth (2001-2005), Eleventh (2006-
2010), and Twelfth (2011-2015) Five-Year Plans, and uses them as dummy variables 
(e.g. 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡, 𝑒𝑙𝑣𝑛𝑡, 𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑡ℎ𝑡⁡respectively) to control for the potential impact of 
government’s economic policies and time effects. 
As presented in Figure 3, granted patents are not evenly distributed across 
regions. The Eastern region is an obvious leader in all three categories of patents, while 
the difference is less drastic between the Middle and Western regions. Coastal provinces 
were the first to open High Economic and Technological Development Zones that 
attracted foreign investment. Hence, the paper includes regional dummy variables (𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑗, 
𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑗, 𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗) to control for potential regional differences.  
5. Two Stage Least Squares Model 
Reverse causality makes estimations of economic inequality problematic. Many 
determinants used in the model are the results of the same economic process, hence 
ignoring this issue bias the interpretation of data. For example, while higher penetration 
of mobile phones can decrease income inequality due to a more equal access to 
information, reverse effect can be true as well – lower income inequality can signal that 
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more people can afford mobile phones. Endogenous independent variables can become 
correlated with the error term ε, which would undermine the validity of the estimates of 
an ordinary least squares regression model. 
To disentangle the cause and effect relationship between income inequality and the 
independent variables, this paper uses a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Regression 
model. Using the correlation between independent variables and Theil Index, this study 
has determined instrumental variables that are highly correlated with the total number of 
patents, but are not correlated with Theil Index. Below is 2SLS regression model 
employed in to explain the influence of total number of patents granted on the within-
region inequality: 
(1) 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙i,t=𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑛𝑡𝑗,𝑡−3 + 𝛽2𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑗,𝑡−3⁡+𝛽3𝑓𝑠𝑏𝑠𝑗,𝑡−3 +
𝛽4𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑗,𝑡⁡+𝛽5𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑡+𝛽6⁡𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗, + 𝛽8𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑗, + 𝛽9𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡, +
𝛽10𝑒𝑙𝑣𝑛𝑡+𝛽11𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑗,𝑡+⁡𝛽12𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑡+⁡𝛽13𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑗,𝑡−3+⁡ε⁡⁡ 
 Where the total number of patents (𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑛𝑡𝑗,𝑡−3) is instrumented by the number of higher 
education institutions (𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑗,𝑡), the health worker density (𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑗,𝑡), the number 
of private enterprises (𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑡), the change in the price of corporate housing 
(ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡), the number of mobile phone subscribers (𝑚𝑠𝑏𝑠𝑗,𝑡−3), and the proportion of 
operating highways and railways to the areas of the province (𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑗,𝑡). The main criterion 
for selection of instrumental variables was the strength of correlation between the 
variables and the total number of patents, in contrast to the correlation between the 
variables and the dependent variables. Only the variables that were strongly correlated 
with the total number of patents and weakly correlated with the log transformed value of 
the Theil index were used as instruments. Correlation coefficients suggest that the 
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number of higher education institutions, the density of health workers, the number of 
private enterprises, the number of mobile phone subscribers, and the proportion of 
operating highways and railways are positively correlated with the total number of 
patents granted, while increase in the selling price of corporate housing is associated with 
lower number of patents granted.  
 The model posits that within-region inequality of consumption in a region i in the 
year t depends on total number of patents granted in the province j in the year t-3, 
education funding for the province j in the year t-3, the number of mobile telephone 
subscribers in province j in year t-3, the GRP per capita  
 growth rate in province j in year t, the inflation in 
province j, the country-level interest rate spread in year t, 
the economic growth rate in province j in year t, the 
savings rate in year t, and the urban unemployment rate in 
province j in year t-3, controlling for time and regional 
differences. The increase in innovative activity, investment 
in education, penetration of telephones, and interest rate 
spread are expected to decrease income inequality in a 
region. Inflation, higher savings, and higher economic 
growth are expected to worsen the existing state of income 
inequality. The proposed signs of the regression 
coefficients are summarized in Table 2. 
To discriminate which types of innovation are responsible for the observed effects, 
this paper has utilized instrumental variables technique by using 2SLS regression model.  
Table 2 
Predicted Signs of the 
Regression Coefficients. 
Variable Sign 
𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑛𝑡𝑗,𝑡−3 - 
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−3 - 
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑗,𝑡−3 - 
𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑡−3 - 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑗,𝑡 + 
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑠𝑡⁡𝑡 -/+ 
𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑡⁡ + 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑗,𝑡−3 - 
ℎ𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑗,𝑡 - 
𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡 + 
𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑗,𝑡⁡ - 
𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑗,𝑡
 - 
𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗,𝑡
 - 
𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑗,𝑡 + 
𝑒𝑙𝑣𝑛𝑗,𝑡 + 
𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑗,𝑡−3 - 
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(2) 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙i,t=𝜑0 +𝜑1𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑡−3 + 𝜑2𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−3 + 𝜑3𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑗,𝑡−3 +
𝜑4𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑗,𝑡−3⁡+𝜑5𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡 +𝜑6𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑗,𝑡⁡+𝜑7𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝜑8𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑗,𝑡 +
𝜑10𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗 +⁡𝜑11𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑗 + 𝜑12𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡 +𝜑13𝑒𝑙𝑣𝑛𝑡 +
𝜑14𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑗,𝑡−3+𝜑15𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑡+⁡ε⁡⁡ 
where 𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑡−3, 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−3, 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑗,𝑡−3 are instrumented using the same variables 
as in equation (1). Therefore, inequality of consumption in the region i in year t depends 
on the total number of patents granted for utility, invention, and design in the province j 
in year t-3, the inflation rate in province j and the interest rate spread in year t, the 
education funds in province j in year t-3, the annual change in savings preferences in 
province j in year t, the annual change in GRP per capita and economic growth in 
province j in year t, the urban unemployment rate and the number of mobile telephone 
subscribers j in the year t-3. All three equations include dummy variables to control for 
regional differences (𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗, 𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑗) and time effects (𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡, 𝑒𝑙𝑣𝑛𝑡). 
5.1 Results 
The empirical results of the 2SLS regressions are presented in Table 2 along with 
results of OLS models for comparison. The summary of the percentile shifts is presented 
in Table 6, whereas the more complete version of the table can be found in the Appendix. 
Model 1 uses the total number of patents granted as a predictor of the change in regional 
inequality of consumption, while Model 2 differentiates the patent types to highlight how 
each is responsible for the observed effects. The dependent variables in both models is 
the log transformed value of the Theil index. To detect potential multicollinearity issues, 
I used variance inflation factors (VIF tests) for both models, and no evidence of 
multicollinearity was found in either of the equations. Several independent variables were 
not normally distributed, resulting in a large kurtosis value, hence I used the change in 
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percentile range for interpretation of the coefficients.  
While the influence of the total number of patents granted per 10000 residents is 
statistically significant in the OLS model, the significance is lost with the introduction of 
instrumental variables, which increased the standard error thereby decreasing the 
statistical significance of the regression coefficient.  
When analyzed separately, design patents gain statistical significance, suggesting that 
when analyzing the influence of patents, the sum is different than its parts. The evidence 
suggests that an increase from the 10th percentile to the 25th percentile in the number of 
design patents granted is expected to decrease within region income inequality by 0.8 
percentage points, while utility and invention patents fail to reach statistical significance.  
The results indicate a consistently significant impact of the savings rate, suggesting 
than a 10-percentage point increase in the savings rate is associated with a 1.29 
percentage point increase in income inequality within a region i. The finding implies that 
wealthy individuals are able to save more to either secure higher income in the future or 
pass it on to the future generations, which worsens the inequality within regions, which 
provides more evidence in support of Alvarez-Cuadrado & Vilalta’s (2012) work.  
The interest rate spread had a significant negative influence on the change in income 
inequality across both models, suggesting that a 1% increase in the difference between 
the lending and the borrowing rates is expected to decrease interregional income 
inequality by 0.1 percentage points. This result might seem counterintuitive as the benefit 
of workers is relatively smaller than that of the bank. However, as the IMF indicated, a 
wider interest rate spread is associated with the strengthening of financial sector, 
capturing the increased and efficient flow of capital (IMF, 2017). Therefore, the IMF 
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suggests that an increased interest rate spread is a valid predictor of poverty reduction, 
and declining inequality.  
  Holding all things constant, Model 2 predicts that each percent of the Gross 
Regional Product invested in education is expected to increase within-region inequality 
by 4.1 percentage points. One of the potential explanations for this effect is that increased 
investment in education can widen intergenerational divide between individuals, and 
offer more wage premium to the younger population. Due to the limited access to 
education during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), nowadays young professionals 
occupy most of the high-status managerial positions due to their educational advantage. 
Moreover, the returns to education depend on the availability of educational institutions 
in a province and its rank, such that the provinces that have a higher concentration of top-
tier universities and schools (e.g. Beijing) will benefit from the increased investment 
more than the ones that do not (e.g. Hubei). Therefore, the potential for increased 
investment in education to worsen inequality between regions might be explained by 
differential access to educational institutions and increased intergenerational inequality. 
Furthermore, Model 2 highlights the proportion of higher education graduates in a 
population as a significant contributor to narrowing the income gap between provinces in 
a region. The coefficient conveys that as a province shifts from the 10th percentile to the 
25th percentile in the distribution, within-region income inequality decreases by 8.9 
percentage points, ceteris paribus. Access to postsecondary education has been linked to 
a series of socially desirable outcomes such as higher incomes, greater job satisfaction, 
and better voting decisions (Hill, 2015). The author also suggests that widening income 
gap in the US can be explained by unequal access to education, whereby only wealthy 
individuals can afford the tuition fee, and enjoy the benefits. While this could also be true 
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in China, I believe that the coefficient reflects the meritocratic aspect of Chinese society, 
stressing that those who work hard are rewarded. Individuals from low socioeconomic 
status have the same chance of entering the best university in China as wealthy 
individuals, and this equal access to higher education puts downward pressure on within-
region income inequality. 
 Both models have demonstrated consistent regional and time effects. According 
to Model 2 predictions, inequality in the Eastern region is 301.3 percentage points higher 
than in the Middle region, and 164.6 percentage points higher than in the Western region, 
suggesting that inequality between provinces is higher in the more developed regions 
than in the underdeveloped regions. Furthermore, the values of income inequality have 
been shown to be 32.7 percentage points higher during the Eleventh FYP when compared 
to the most recent Twelfth FYP. Based on these results, the inequality has decreased 
during the years (2006-2010), while no significant difference was observed between 
inequality in 2001-2005 and 2011-2015, ceteris paribus. Tenth and Eleventh FYP are 
characterized by a series of strategies that aim to stimulate economic growth in less 
developed areas. For example, the Western Development strategy (xibu dakaifa) 
prioritizes the economic advancement of the Middle and 
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the Western regions, and ‘New Socialist Countryside’ (shehui zhuyi xinnongcun) that 
aims to promote rural sector as a part of a broader ideological campaign that intends to 
transform China into ‘Universal Society of Moderate Prosperity’ (quanmian jiangshe 
xiaokang shehui) by the end of 2020. The 
results suggest that the implementation of 
policies did have a significant influence on 
between-province income inequality, but 
the effect was not instantaneous. While 
these results seem implausibly large, the 
model pinpoints significant spatial and time 
effects, suggesting that although the 
Chinese government has been taking steps 
to decrease interregional inequality, spatial 
differences continue to persist.  
6. Spatial Durbin Model 
The low cost of information 
technologies decreases the cost of knowledge transfers across provinces and regions. 
Differences in human capital and infrastructure, however, slow down the diffusion of 
knowledge. Constitutional restrictions on migration and cultural disparities suggest that 
transaction costs increase with distance, and knowledge is more likely to spill to 
bordering provinces, rather than to distant ones. 
Based on highly significant regional differences, I calculated Moran’s I test statistic 
to test for the evidence of spatial autocorrelation. The coefficients on the patents granted 
for utility and design indicate statistically significant evidence for negative spatial 
Table 6 
Summary of percentile shifts, 10th to 25th  
 
Variable 2SLSII Total 
effects 
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−3 ns 0.004*** 
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑗,𝑡−3 -0.008** -0.007*** 
𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑡−3 ns -0.011*** 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑗,𝑡 ns 0.055*** 
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑠𝑡⁡𝑡 0.001** -0.000*** 
𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑡⁡ ns ns 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑗,𝑡−3 0.041*** ns 
⁡𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑠𝑗,𝑡⁡  -0.154*** 
ℎ𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑗,𝑡 -0.089*** 0.196*** 
𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡 0.129*** -0.412*** 
ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑗,𝑡⁡  0.191*** 
𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑗,𝑡⁡ ns -0.116*** 
𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑗,𝑡
 -3.013***  
𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗,𝑡
 -1.646***  
𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑗,𝑡 ns  
𝑒𝑙𝑣𝑛𝑗,𝑡 0.327***  
𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑗,𝑡−3 ns -0.098*** 
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autocorrelation, suggesting that the number of patents granted in one region is negatively 
correlated with the value of neighboring regions. Kao (2016) cited the backwash effect 
(Myrdal, 1957 as cited in Kao, 2016) that states that economic development in province j 
attracts both human and capital resources from the neighboring provinces, which in turn 
decreases their economic attractiveness, thus decreasing the rates of economic growth in 
the neighboring provinces and widening within-region disparity.  
To evaluate provincial spillover effects between the independent variables and inter-
provincial inequality, I have employed Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) that investigates 
both exogenous and endogenous interaction effects (Pace & LeSage, 2010). A simplified 
formula for the model used is presented below:  
(3) 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙i,t=𝜌 ∗ 𝑊 ∗ 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜅𝑋 + 𝜗 ∗𝑊 ∗ 𝑋 + ⁡𝜀 
where , 𝜌𝑊𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑖,𝑡 is a N*1 vector of a spatial lagged dependent variable, the i
th 
observation of which measures the consumption inequality in the nearby region, where ρ 
is a spatial autoregressive parameter, W is a N*N spatial weight matrix that describes 
spatial arrangement of the provinces in the sample; κ is the direct effect parameter that 
estimates the impact of a change in value of the independent variable of a province j on 
the interprovincial inequality in the region it belongs to, while θ is the spatial spillover 
parameter that estimates the effect of the change in value of independent variable in a 
province j on interprovincial inequality in the neighboring region. The formula suggests 
that income inequality for each region depends on own-region factors, κ, and the average 
of neighboring region factors, θ. For example, a higher number of patents granted in 
region i can decrease income inequality within a neighboring region, as the new products 
will stimulate competition within the province allowing more people to enjoy competitive 
advantage, and lowering the price.  
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Following Shang, Poon, &Yue (2012), this paper employed a contiguity-based 
inverse distance spatial matrix. The contiguity based specification assigns equal 
weight to the provinces that share a border, assuming that economic activity of 
neighboring provinces equally affects economic activity in region j. As per 
provinces that do not share a border, the weight applied to the effect of independent 
variables in province j on the value of dependent variable in non-adjacent is 
proportional to the average inverse distance between provincial capitals.  
6.1 Results 
The results for the SDM model are presented in Table 5 in the appendix, where 
column κ corresponds to the κ parameter in the equation, and column θ represents 
the impact of the values of the independent variables from the neighboring 
provinces. The summary of the percentile shifts can be found in Table 6, whereas a 
more complete version of the table is included in the Appendix. As outlined by 
LeSage (2008) the estimates from the SDM model cannot be interpreted as partial 
derivatives as it is done in standard regression models. Hence, to quantify the 
magnitude of the impacts of the independent variables, I computed the average 
direct, indirect, and total effects. Average direct effects indicate the extent to which 
a change in the value in an independent variable in region i can influence the value 
of the Theil index in a region i, while the indirect effects elucidate the extent to 
which changes in an independent variable influence the value of the Theil index in 
other regions. The summary of the statistically significant percentile shifts is 
presented in Table 6.  
The results indicate that as a province shifts from the 10th to the 25th percentile in 
the distribution of patents grated for invention, the intraregional income inequality 
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within the region it belongs to increases by 0.3 percentage points. Moreover, when 
combined with indirect effects, the regression coefficient suggests an equivalent 
shift widens interprovincial income inequality by 0.4 percentage points. Of three 
patent types, invention patent is granted are protected for the longest period of time 
and are required to demonstrate the highest level of novelty and progress. As per 
Schumpeter’s prediction, innovative entrepreneurs are rewarded for their novelty 
with access to monopoly power until someone outperforms them, hence increasing 
innovation results in higher within-region income inequality.  
Interestingly, though both endogenous and exogenous effects of utility and 
design patents granted are not statistically significant, average total effects show 
strong statistically significant evidence suggesting that both patent types have a 
potential to decrease income inequality between provinces in a region. When a 
province’s patents granted for design shift its position in an overall distribution from 
the 10th percentile to the 25th percentile, within-region income inequality is expected 
to go down by 0.7 percentage points. The same percentile shift in the number of 
utility patents granted results in a highly statistically significant decrease in income 
inequality by 1.1 percentage points. Both design and utility patents allow the holder 
to enjoy short-term monopoly power, as the competitive advantage is very fleeting. 
Nimble competitors quickly adjust to such changes; hence the patent holder is very 
likely to lose his competitive advantage. Therefore, an increased number of patents 
granted in utility and design allow other entrepreneurs to benefit from the invention 
of a patent holder by adapting the existing knowledge and sharing monopoly profits. 
The results for a percent change in GRP per capita demonstrate neither a 
direct nor an indirect impact, rather strong evidence for a combination of both, as 
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demonstrated by highly significant κ and θ coefficients, and highly significant total 
effects. The results suggest that a 1 percentage point increase in GRP per capita 
growth rate is expected to decrease income inequality by 4.4 percentage points. The 
significant total effect of GRP per capita demonstrates that as economic growth 
trickles down to everyone in the population average incomes start to converge across 
provinces, thereby decreasing intra-regional inequality.  
Health worker density has also been demonstrated to be a significant 
predictor of inequality between provinces, showing that each additional medical 
professional per 1000 people is expected to decrease income inequality by 22.5 
percentage points, ceteris paribus. While this result might seem overwhelming, it is 
worth noting that a 15-percentile shift from the 10th percentile to the 25th results in a 
15.4 percentile point decrease. This result highlights a widely-known notion of 
importance of healthcare for a fairer economic development, suggesting that more 
access to healthcare means more active and efficient labor force.  
In contrast to the results of 2SLS presented in the Table 3, a 1% increase in 
the savings rate is expected to decrease income inequality by 47.1 percentage points. 
Furthermore, a 15-percentile shift from the 10th percentile to the 25th is expected to 
decrease intraregional income inequality by 41.2 percentage points. According to the 
permanent income hypothesis, an increased saving rate allows the residents to buffer 
the expected loss of wealth, as well as facilitate the intergenerational transfer of 
income, thereby decreasing the disparity between generations.  
Counterintuitively, the rising urban unemployment rate is expected to 
decrease income inequality between provinces by 16.4 percentage points. Many 
studies have highlighted the significance of the urban-rural divide on the total 
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inequality in China. For example, Yao (2005) suggests that the urban-rural divide 
accounts for almost two thirds of overall income inequality in China. In the context 
of these findings, the negative impact of the increasing urban unemployment rate on 
the disparity between average income in provinces within a region can be explained 
not by higher income of rural households but rather by a lower average income of 
urban households, which then decreases the disparity within regions.  
The model includes the cost of corporate housing to account for costs 
associated with starting or sustaining a business. The findings indicate that a 10-
percentage point increase in the average selling price of commercial buildings is 
expected to increase between province income inequality by 6.63 percentage points. 
The findings suggest that increased fixed cost associated with private 
entrepreneurship widens the gap between provinces, potentially because individuals 
are deterred from engaging in enterpreneurial activity due to the high cost associated 
with it.  
The results underscore education as another important factor affecting 
within-region inequality. Holding all things constant, as a province invests a larger 
proportion of its GRP into education, inequality between provinces in the region it 
belongs to is expected to increase by 7.6 percentage points, which is demonstrated 
by statistically significant direct effect. However, this result fails to reach statistical 
significance on a country-level. On the same note a higher proportion of higher 
education graduates in a province causes a higher level of within region inequality. 
This result is supported by statistically significant total average effect of the 
regression coefficient that predicts that as a province shifts from the 10th percentile 
to the 25th percentile in the distribution of the number of higher education graduates, 
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the within-province inequality increases by 19.6 percentage points. An increased 
proportion of educated labor can widen the gap between educated and uneducated 
labor, which would increase the disparity between purchasing ability of both parties. 
Therefore, the disparity between the provinces with high proportions of university 
graduates and comparable provinces with low proportions of university graduates is 
expected to increase. An alternative explanation would suggest that as rural areas 
that mostly require low-skilled labor force, increased government spending on 
education and the higher proportion of university graduates encourages young 
educated labor to pursue employment in more developed areas. Therefore, provinces 
with suitable economic conditions can attract more educated labor, creating a 
disparity between provinces within a region. 
 The results for the inflation rate and the interest rate spread are contrasting. 
Holding all else constant, a 1% increase in the inflation rate widens the income gap 
by 3.6 percentage points, while an equivalent increase in interest rate spread is 
expected to decrease income inequality by 0.4 percentage points. These results 
reflect a significant influence of the health of financial institutions on income 
distribution. Rising inflation lowers the value of assets that people own and the 
wages that they receive, hence increased inflation rate lowers the absolute income 
that people receive. The effect is much more severe for the lower and the middle 
class, who are forced into lowering their consumption behavior, while wealthy 
individuals are largely unaffected. The findings support the idea that, holding all else 
constant, as the inflation rates rise in the whole country, the within region inequality 
is more likely to increase too. The negative influence of the interest rate spread 
seems counterintuitive, as the lenders are relatively at loss, because the cost of 
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borrowing exceeds the gain of lending. In this case, the IMF’s (2017) reasoning 
seems the most appropriate, suggesting that increased yields of financial institutions 
result in a more robust financial sector, which then promotes capital formation and 
sustainable economic development. IMF also suggests that financial institutions play 
an important role in poverty reduction, thereby increasing the average regional 
income and decreasing disparity between provinces. Furthermore, Wei (2000) 
explains that strengthening of financial institutions as a result of increased saving 
and borrowing behaviors have facilitated poverty reduction, as more financial 
resources were channeled into the poorer areas.  
7. Conclusions and Future Directions 
Transitioning from a planned economy, which was centered around the idea of 
egalitarianism, to market-based economy, that aims to reward citizens based on their 
contribution to the economic development, has resulted various types of income 
inequality. While some of types of inequality was caused by introducing material 
incentives that aimed to increase economic efficiency and equity, many stemmed 
from geographical prioritization that increased both provincial and regional divide. 
Chinese government has expressed concern about the degree of inequality observed, 
and has taken various steps to improve the situation to avoid social unrest. 
This paper used provincial data from the China Statistical Yearbook to examine 
the impact of innovation on within-region inequality over the course of the last 15 
years. It builds on the existing literature on regional inequality by investigating the 
impact of innovation and its types on interprovincial income inequality, and 
exploring the spillover effects of innovation as a way of suggests decreasing the 
effect of provincial segmentation to allow the citizens equal access to income 
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opportunities. The findings suggest that: (a) innovation, depicted by the patents 
granted for design and utility, has a potential to decrease China’s intraregional 
inequality due to its transitory nature that allows many business owners to profit 
from building on new ideas, thereby encouraging competition and preventing 
formation of monopolies. However, invention patents further worsen provincial 
divide by allowing some entrepreneurs to retain the monopoly power and reap 
profits; (b) an increased education expenditure and a higher proportion of university 
graduates widens the gap between the average income levels across provinces as the 
educated labor force tends to agglomerate in the highly advanced provinces and 
urban areas, thereby decreasing economic potential of less advanced provinces that 
is forced into low-return production, and regions with higher proportion of top-tier 
institutions benefit more from the increased education expenditure; (c) 
macroeconomic stability that is captured by the distribution of economic 
development, the inflation rate, and the interest rate spread has a significant impact 
on differences in provincial income levels, whereby the stability of financial 
institution and even distribution of economic growth has been found to decrease 
income inequality across provinces. 
A number of major policy implications can be derived from the empirical 
findings of this paper. Firstly, to decrease inequality among provinces in the same 
region the government should put more effort into entrepreneurial development, 
rather than invention, which can be achieved by lowering the costs of 
entrepreneurial activity. While invention may offer the country more competitive 
advantage in the global market, innovation has a potential of boosting regional and 
provincial development as well as lowering the disparity that was created due to 
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geographical prioritization. The government should encourage more cooperative 
efforts across provinces that would stimulate a faster and more efficient diffusion of 
knowledge. Wang & Zhao (2014) has suggested that in order to smooth out 
provincial differences in fiscal capital, the government should provide less 
developed provinces with equalizing grants that would facilitate education, 
infrastructure, and living standards that would in turn boost innovative capacity and 
lower between-province income inequality.  
Several sources have stressed that fiscal decentralization has further enhanced 
disparities between provinces by allowing local governments to enforce trade 
barriers to protect local economies (Cannon, 1990; Wei, 2000). Specifically, Cannon 
(1990) cites the evidence for  “resource wars” that refer to the tendency of provinces 
to restrict supply of raw resources needed for production of goods in another 
province. Moreover, local governments oversaw the interest rates set by the local 
branches of bank, and manipulated them to protect provincial economy. Both 
Cannon (1990) and Wei (2000) suggest that the central government has limited 
influence on the distribution of monetary and natural resources between provinces, 
hence as long as interprovincial rivalry persist the diffusion of knowledge and 
innovation will be obstructed.  
The mismatch between the estimates of 2SLS and SDM models can be driven by 
endogeneity that was not controlled for in the spatial analysis, hence future research 
should employ a Generalized Spatial Two Stage Least Squares to correct for 
potential biases. Moreover, several variables could not be included in the spatial 
analysis due to missing data. Future research should seek out additional approaches 
of measuring variables such as penetration of information technology, education 
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expenditures, and infrastructure development.  
While the findings failed to provide the evidence for spillover effects, going 
against Perroux’s growth pole theory, the effect size of the predictions was rather 
small, thereby suggesting that the estimates lacked precision. This calls for caution 
in the interpretation of the regression coefficients. Kao (2016) suggested that this 
might be the influence of existing negative spatial autocorrelation that has been 
shown to impact both the coefficients and the significance level of the regression 
coefficients, however the nature of the impacts has not been fully understood. Future 
studies should employ various spatial autoregressive models to ensure the 
consistency across results. 
One of the major limitation of the study is absence of data on the provincial 
Foreign Direct Investment. Previous studies that included this variable when 
examining innovation in China (e.g. Shang, Poon, & Yue, 2012) have found 
evidence for innovation clustering, in contrast to negative spatial autocorrelation 
finding of my study. Furthermore, I was unable to obtain the values for the interest 
rate spread on the provincial level, suggesting that the results obtained should be 
interpreted with caution. Due to the ability of local governments to directly 
influence the lending practices of the provincial banks, future studies should strive 
to obtain the interest rate values on the provincial level. While data availability is 
often out of the researchers’ control, future studies should explore alternative 
sources of data to ensure consistent results.  
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Regional Distribution of Innovation Clusters (CIC) in China.  
Source: Yu, W., Hong, J., Zhu, Y., Marinova, D., & Guo, X. (2014). Creative industry clusters, regional 
innovation and economic growth in China. Regional Science Policy & Practice, 6(4), 329-347. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/rsp3.12051 
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Figure 2. Geographical Distribution of Income in 1952 and 2008.  
Source: Herrerias, M., & Ordoñez, J. (2012). New evidence on the role of regional clusters and 
convergence in China (1952–2008). China Economic Review, 23(4), 1120-1133. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2012.08.001 
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Figure 3. Average Number of Patents Granted by Type and Region. 
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Figure 4. Density of Health Workers and Higher Education Institutions, 2000-2015. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics.  
Notation Description Mean SD 
𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑙i,t Natural log of Theil index by region  4.170 1.449 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑗,𝑡 Number of Higher Education Institutions 
(unit/1000 people) 
17.569 8.383 
ℎ𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑗,𝑡 Number of University Graduates (% of population) .323 .198 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑗,𝑡 Inflation rate (%) .204 2.639 
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑠𝑡⁡𝑡 Interest Rate Spread (%) 4.963 6.630 
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑡⁡ Private enterprises (unit/1000 persons) 0.099 0.120 
𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑗,𝑡⁡ Change in GRP per capita (%) 13.501 6.342 
𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑡⁡ Real GRP rate (%) 1.536 5.167 
𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑛𝑡𝑗,𝑡−3 Total number of patents granted per 10000 persons 
(3-year lag applied)  
2.168 4.233 
𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑡−3 Number of patents granted for utility models per 
1000 persons (3-year lag) 
1.062 1.862 
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−3 Number of patents granted for invention per 1000 
persons (3-year lag) 
0.301 0.826 
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑗,𝑡−3 Number of patents granted for design per 1000 
persons (3-year lag) 
0.804 2.034 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑗,𝑡−3 Education funds as % of GRP (3-year lag) 4.736 1.676 
𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡 Saving rate (natural log of saving deposits) 8.372 1.239 
𝑚𝑠𝑏𝑠𝑗,𝑡−3 Mobile telephone subscribers per 1000 persons (3-
year lag) 
360.941 297.331 
𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑗,𝑡−3 Urban unemployment rate (%, 3-year lag) 3.581 .812 
𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑠𝑗,𝑡 Health worker density per 1000 residents 5.734 1.904 
ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡⁡ Natural log of average selling price for commercial 
buildings (yuan/sqm)  
8.067 0.626 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑗,𝑡⁡ Length of railways and highways over the area of 
the province  
0.687 0.465 
𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡 1 if Tenth five-year plan, otherwise 0 (2001-2005) - - 
𝑒𝑙𝑣𝑛𝑡 1 if Eleventh five-year plan, otherwise 0 (2006-
2010) 
- - 
𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑡ℎ𝑡 1 if Twelfth five-year plan, 0 otherwise (2011-
2015) 
  
𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑗3
 1 if Eastern Region, otherwise 0 - - 
𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑗4
 1 if Middle Region, otherwise 0 - - 
𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗5
 1 if Western Region, otherwise 0 - - 
. 
                                                             
3The Eastern region includes: Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hebei, Hainan, Jiangsu, Liaoning, 
Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang. 
4The Middle/Central region includes Anhui, Heilongjiang, Hubei, Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Jiangxi, Jilin, 
Shanxi, and Henan. 
5The Western region includes Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, 
Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang. 
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Table 2 
Predicted Signs of the Regression Coefficients. 
Variable Sign 
𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑛𝑡𝑗,𝑡−3 - 
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−3 - 
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑗,𝑡−3 - 
𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑡−3 - 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑗,𝑡 + 
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑠𝑡⁡𝑡 -/+ 
𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑡⁡ + 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑗,𝑡−3 - 
ℎ𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑗,𝑡 - 
𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡 + 
𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑗,𝑡⁡ - 
𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑗,𝑡
 - 
𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗,𝑡
 - 
𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑗,𝑡 + 
𝑒𝑙𝑣𝑛𝑗,𝑡 + 
𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑗,𝑡−3 - 
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Table 3 
Results of 2SLS.  
 OLS 2SLSI OLS 2SLSII 
𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑛𝑡𝑗,𝑡−3 -0.016** -0.015   
 (0.007) (0.011)   
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−3   -0.025 -0.200 
   (0.051) (0.221) 
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑗,𝑡−3   -0.013 -0.216** 
   (0.019) (0.097) 
𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑡−3   -0.017 0.267 
   (0.033) (0.183) 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑗,𝑡 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.011 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) 
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑗,𝑡 -0.008** -0.009** -0.008** -0.009** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑡⁡ 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑗,𝑡−3 0.082** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.101*** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.023) 
ℎ𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑗,𝑡 -0.759*** -0.551 -0.739*** -1.166*** 
 (0.171) (0.183) (0.184) (0.322) 
𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡 0.104*** 0.109*** 0.102*** 0.147*** 
 (0.028) (0.031) (0.028) (0.038) 
𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑗,𝑡⁡ 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑗,𝑡
 
-2.944*** -2.994*** -2.944*** -3.013*** 
 (0.061) (0.065) (0.061) (0.077) 
𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗,𝑡
 
-1.695*** -1.618*** -1.693*** -1.646*** 
 (0.069) (0.072) (0.069) (0.086) 
𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑗,𝑡 -0.087 0.056 -0.087 0.043 
 (0.068) (0.089) (0.068) (0.103) 
𝑒𝑙𝑣𝑛𝑗,𝑡 0.195*** 0.249*** 0.195*** 0.327*** 
 (0.065) (0.071) (0.065) (0.103) 
𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑗,𝑡−3 -0.083*** -0.029 -0.085*** -0.015 
 (0.030) (0.033) (0.031) (0.046) 
Constant  -3.218*** -3.560*** -3.201*** -3.966*** 
 (0.296) (0.371) (0.301) (0.449) 
R2 0.85 0.867 0.850 0.825 
N 496 450 496 450 
Standard errors are presented in parenthesis beneath the coefficients. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively.  
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Table 4  
Moran’s I statistics.  
 Moran’s I 
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−3 -0.057* 
 (-0.033) 
𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑡−3 -0.068** 
 (-0.033) 
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑗,𝑡−3 -0.098*** 
 (-0.033) 
Standard errors are presented in parenthesis beneath the coefficients. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively.  
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Table 5 
Results of the Spatial Durbin Fixed Effects Regressions Model with Marginal Effects. 
 
 Κ Θ Direct Indirect Total 
Ρ 0.300***     
 (0.004)     
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑗,𝑡−3 0.248*** 0.054*** -0.146 -0.057 -0.203*** 
 (0.088) (0.012) (0.091) (0.084) (0.044) 
𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑡−3 0.196 0.037*** -0.097 -0.043 -0.140*** 
 (0.149) (0.011) (0.076) (0.068) (0.036) 
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−3 -0.277 -0.094*** 0.265* 0.077 0.342*** 
 (0.249) (0.028) (0.154) (0.126) (0.102) 
𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑗,𝑡⁡ 0.075*** 0.011*** -0.029 -0.015 -0.044*** 
 (0.025) (0.001) (0.022) (0.022) (0.005) 
ℎ𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑗,𝑡 -6.937*** -0.606*** 1.333 1.208 2.541*** 
 (1.660) (0.131) (1.780) (1.759) (0.486) 
𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑠𝑗,𝑡⁡ -0.605*** 0.074*** -0.275*** 0.050 -0.225*** 
 (0.176) (0.011) (0.088) (0.082) (0.042) 
ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡 -3.551*** -0.130** 0.130 0.533 0.663*** 
 (0.814) (0.057) (0.801) (0.775) (0.219) 
𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡 5.265*** 0.047 0.248 -0.719 -0.471*** 
 (0.983) (0.035) (1.056) (1.045) (0.110) 
𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑗,𝑡−3 -0.040 0.047*** -0.150 -0.014 -0.164*** 
 (0.168) (0.012) (0.054) (0.046) (0.041) 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑗,𝑡−3 0.523*** -0.012 0.076*** -0.066 0.011 
 (0.134) (0.010) 0.099 (0.096) (0.034) 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑗,𝑡 -0.044 -0.010*** (0.026) 0.011 0.036*** 
 (0.068) (0.002) 0.021 (0.021) (0.006) 
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 -0.049 0.002 -0.009 0.005 -0.004*** 
 (0.088) (0.001) (0.021) (0.021) (0.001) 
R2 0.023 0.01    
N 496     
Standard errors are presented in parenthesis beneath the coefficients. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively.  
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Table 6 
Summary of percentile shifts, 10th to 25th percentile. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively, ns indicates 
statistically insignificant finding.   
 2SLS models SDM results 
Variable 2SLSI 2SLSII Direct 
effects 
Total 
effects 
𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑛𝑡𝑗,𝑡−3 ns    
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−3  ns 0.003* 0.004*** 
𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑗,𝑡−3  -0.008** ns -0.007*** 
𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗,𝑡−3  ns ns -0.011*** 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑗,𝑡 ns ns ns 0.055*** 
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑠𝑡⁡𝑡 -0.001** 0.001** ns -0.000*** 
𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗,𝑡⁡ ns ns ns ns 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑗,𝑡−3 0.008*** 0.041*** 0.031*** ns 
⁡𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑠𝑗,𝑡⁡   -0.188*** -0.154*** 
ℎ𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑗,𝑡 ns -0.089*** ns 0.196*** 
𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡 0.095*** 0.129*** ns -0.412*** 
ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑗,𝑡⁡   ns 0.191*** 
𝑔𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑗,𝑡⁡ ns ns ns -0.116*** 
𝑚𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑗,𝑡
 -2.994*** -3.013***   
𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗,𝑡
 -1.618*** -1.646***   
𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑗,𝑡 ns ns   
𝑒𝑙𝑣𝑛𝑗,𝑡 -1.646*** 0.327***   
𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑗,𝑡−3 ns ns ns -0.098*** 
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